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Portuguese Abstract (Sumário) 
 
O objectivo desta dissertação é estudar a evolução da política da UE para a África num 
período de sete anos entre 2000 e 2007 – desde a primeira à segunda Cimeira Europa-
África. A investigação pretende identificar que motivos e forças foram dominantes na 
UE em formar a Parceria Estratégica Conjunta entre os dois continentes e a sua 
importância para o posicionamento da UE no mundo. Por um lado, a investigação 
pretende estudar documentos relativos ao diálogo UE-África, e considerados cruciais 
para determinar que interesses, ideias e discursos foram dominantes; por outro lado, vai 
investigar documentos relacionados a estratégias paralelas durante o mesmo período 
igualmente considerados determinantes para a evolução da política da UE para a África. 
 
A tese é que as políticas para a África da UE devem ser vistas num contexto politico 
mais amplo em que a UE ambiciona projectar-se no mundo como um actor global de 
peso com o poder para activamente influenciar a política mundial através duma 
abordagem mais elaborada que passa por integrar, alinhar e coordenar diversos 
instrumentos de acção externa com estratégias que a conferem uma maior visibilidade 
no mundo. 
 
A investigação conclui que a África representa um núcleo importante de interesses para 
a UE. Motivos e interesses são mistos e englobam aspectos políticos, económicos, 
militares, de segurança, sociais, ambientais e morais. A proximidade geográfica da 
África, as suas relações históricas com Estados Membros da UE e baixo sensibilidade 
político como região em comparação por exemplo com o Médio Oriente são factores 
importantes que têm contribuído para um alto nível de consenso entre os Estados 
Membros sobre a coordenação de diferentes instrumentos políticos como maneira de 
estabelecer uma política externa coerente e eficaz através de iniciativas que vão desde 
ajuda para o desenvolvimento e ajuda humanitária a acção militar incluindo iniciativas 
que abrangem prevenção de conflitos, gestão de conflitos, e missões de paz. 
 
Palavras-chave: Europa-África, estratégia, relações externas, segurança, globalização. 
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Abstract 
 
The scope of this thesis is to study the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy in a 
timeframe of seven years between 2000 and 2007 - from the first to the second EU-
Africa Summit. The study aims to identify dominant EU motives and forces in shaping 
a Joint Strategic Partnership between the two continents and its importance for the EU’s 
positioning in the world.  On the one hand, the study will investigate documents relating 
to the EU-Africa dialogue, and considered key to determine which interests, actors, and 
discourse have been dominant; on the other hand, it will investigate documents linked to 
parallel EU strategies over the same period likewise considered key to the evolution of 
the EU’s Africa policy. 
 
The thesis is that EU Africa policies must be seen in a wider political context in which 
the EU aims to project itself in the world as a significant international actor with the 
power to actively influence world politics through a more integrated approach by 
integrating, mainstreaming and coordinating external policies and instruments including 
strategies leading to a greater visibility in the world. 
 
The study concludes that Africa represents an important field of interest for the EU. 
Motives and interests are mixed and include political, economic, military, security, 
social, environmental and moral aspects. Africa’s geographical proximity, its historical 
relations with EU Member States and low political sensitivity as a region compared to 
for example the Middle East are important factors that have allowed for a high degree of 
Member State consensus on coordinating different policy instruments as a means to 
establish a coherent and effective foreign policy through initiatives ranging from 
development aid, over humanitarian assistance to military action with initiatives 
covering conflict prevention, conflict management and peacekeeping missions. 
 
Key words: Europe-Africa, strategy, external relations, security, globalisation.
 5 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ACP   African, Caribbean and Pacific States  
APF   Africa Peace Facility  
APSA   African Peace and Security Architecture 
AU   African Union  
AMIS   AU Mission in Sudan 
CAP   Common Agricultural Policy 
CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy  
DG DEV  Directorate-General for Development 
DG E   Directorate-General for External Relations  
DG RELEX  Directorate-General for External Relations 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo  
EC   European Commission 
ECHO   European Community’s Humanitarian Office 
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management 
EDF   European Development Fund 
ENP   European Neighborhood Programme  
EP   European Parliament 
EPA   Economic Partnership Agreements 
EPC   European Policy Center 
EPC   European Political Cooperation  
ESDP   European Security and Defense Policy 
ESS   European Security Strategy  
EU   European Union  
EUFOR Congo  EU Military Mission in the DRC  
EUPOL Kinshasa  EU Police Mission in Kinshasa  
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
LDC   Least Developed Countries 
MDG   Millenium Development Goals 
MONUC UN  Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
MS   Member States 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
 6 
NEPAD  New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development 
OAU   Organisation of the African Union 
ODA   Official Development Assistance 
OSCE   Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RRM   Rapid Reaction Mechanism  
SALW   Small Arms and Light Weapons  
SIEPS   Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 
TDCA   Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement  
UN   United Nations 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Portuguese abstract (Sumário) 
Abstract 
List of abbreviations 
 
Part One: Analytical framework 
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………   p.10-11 
1.1. Problem formulation……………………………………………………  p.12 
1.2. Structure and delimitation of the subject……………………………….. p.13 
1.3. Theory and methodology……………………………………………….. p.14-15 
1.4. Theoretical and methodological considerations…………………………p.16 
2. European integration theory and world politics…………………………….. p.16-18 
2.1. Four main theoretical views in the study of world politics…………….. p.18-19 
2.2. Three meta-theoretical positions in the study of world politics………... p.19-20 
2.2.1. Liberal intergovernmentalism…………………………………… p.20-22 
2.2.2. Social constructivism……………………………………………. p.22 
2.2.3. Critical discourse analysis………………………………………   p.23 
2.3. Synthesis of the theoretical framework…………………………………..p.24 
2.4. Analytical framework……………………………………………………p.25-26 
2.5. Summary…………………………………………………………………p.26 
 
Part Two: the EU’s Africa Policy from Cairo to Lisbon 
3. Introduction………………………………………………………………….. p.28 
4. EU-Africa Summit Strategies and Agendas…………………………………. p.29 
4.1. The Cairo Summit………………………………………………………. p.29 
4.1.1. The Cairo Declaration…………………………………………… p.29-31 
4.1.2. The Cairo Plan of Action………………………………………… p.31 
4.2. The Lisbon Summit……………………………………………………... p.32-33 
4.2.1. The Lisbon Declaration………………………………………….. p.33 
4.2.2. The Lisbon Joint Strategy……………………………………….. p.33-34 
4.2.3. The First Action Plan (2008-2010)……………………………… p.34-36 
4.3. Comparative analysis of the agendas…………………………………… p.36-40 
4.4. Discussion of interests and ambitions…………………………………... p.40-43 
4.5. Summary………………………………………………………………... p.43-44 
 8 
5. Towards a Joint Africa-EU Strategy: from Cairo to Lisbon………………… p.44-45 
5.1. Changes in Europe, Africa and the world………………………………. p.45-47 
5.2. Summary………………………………………………………………... p.47-48 
6. The EU’s Africa’s policy: interests and ideas……………………………….. p.48 
6.1. External relations capacity and inter-institutional coherence…………... p.48-49 
6.2. Trying out integrated approaches………………………………………. p.49-51 
6.3. Influencing world politics………………………………………………. p.51 
6.4. Synthesis………………………………………………………………... p.52 
7. Africa in the EU security debate: interests, ideas and discourse…………….. p.52 
7.1. Consensus building by prevention and settlement of conflicts…………. p.52-53 
7.2. Complementarity, consistency and coherence………………………….. p.53-55 
7.3. Coordination of instruments: aid, trade and development……………… p.55-57 
7.4. The Horn of Africa……………………………………………………… p.57-58 
7.5. Initiatives launched in Africa within the framework of CFSP/ESDP…... p.59 
7.5.1. Operation “Artemis”…………………………………………….. .p.59 
7.5.2. The African Peace Facility (APF)……………………………….. p.59-60 
7.5.3. The EUPOL-Kinshasa Mission………………………………….. p.60 
7.6. Summary………………………………………………………………... p.60-61 
 
Part Three: The EU and Africa in a global world 
8. Introduction…………………………………………………………………...p.63 
9. Interests, ideas and discourse related to the EU’s Africa Policy……………...p.64 
9.1. The EU and the security complex………………………………………..p.65-68 
9.2. The European Consensus for Development……………………………...p.68-70 
9.3. Greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility………………………….p.70-71 
9.4. The EU-AU Energy Partnership………………………………………... p.71-72 
9.5. Summary………………………………………………………………... p.72-73 
10. Conclusions………………………………………………………………….. p.73-76 
11. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………. p.77-81 
12. Portuguese Summary………………………………………………………… p.83-86 
 9 
 
PART ONE 
Analytical framework 
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1. Introduction 
The Second EU-Africa Summit was held on the 8th and 9th of December 2007 in 
Lisbon under the Portuguese EU Presidency. The participants included 52 countries of 
the African Union, the 27 EU Member States, the EU Commission, and a series of 
representatives from the civil society, including non-governmental and youth groups. 
The Summit was a declared priority of the Portuguese Presidency, who went through a 
great deal of trouble to ensure its realization, right until the last moment at risk for 
cancellation due to political pressure from especially the U.K. over the attendance of 
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe. On the agenda was the adoption of a joint 
strategy and an action plan for the EU-Africa cooperation. 
 
The EU-Africa Joint Strategy presents four clusters of policy priorities: 1) Peace and 
Security; 2) Governance and Human Rights; 3) Trade and Regional Integration; and 4) 
Key Development Issues with the aim to achieve targets of the Millenium Development 
Goals for Food Security, Health, and Education; other issues being: Energy, Climate 
Change Migration, and Information Society.  
 
The Summit agenda reflects the EU’s increasingly elaborate relations with Africa. 
Compared to the agenda of the first EU-Africa Summit held in 2000 in Cairo, where 
economic issues and the question of integrating Africa into the world economy were 
listed above issues as Human Rights and democracy and also peace building, the 2007 
Summit agenda reveals a shift in priorities: Peace and Security and Democratic 
Governance and Human Rights are now listed above Trade, Regional Integration and 
Infrastructure as well as the Millenium Development Goals. 
 
It is argued that strong forces in the EU have ambitions of turning the EU into a global 
superpower, and that this in a combination with the world development since 2001 
(9/11), has contributed to the rise of the security question on the political agenda. Other 
trends such as the increasing importance the EU places on the political dialogue on 
Good Governance and Human Rights with Africa, and the rise on the agenda of 
European issues such as migration and energy access can raise the question whether this 
reflects a new nature of the EU-Africa relationship, or rather if this should be viewed as 
the EU trying to defend its own interest on the expense of development and poverty 
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eradication in Africa.  Because the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership states its ambitions 
as a political “partnership of equals”, never the less, it may be discussed if primarily 
economic interests lie behind the EU’s commitment to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 
 
The Lisbon Declaration states: “In recognition of our ambitions... we are resolved to 
build a new strategic partnership for the future, overcoming the traditional donor-
recipient relationship and building on common values and goals in our pursuit of peace 
and stability, democracy and rule of law, progress and development. We will develop 
this partnership of equals…” This passage raises several questions: one is linked to the 
question of policy coherence between the new Joint Strategy and already existing 
development aid and traditional policy cooperation frameworks for Africa. Another 
question is linked to the idea of common values; first of all it can be discussed what is 
meant by this: does the concept of democracy and rule of law have the same meaning in 
Europe and in Africa? And do Europe and Africa share common goals in their pursuit of 
progress and development? 
 
The combination of the shift in agenda priorities between the first and the second EU-
Africa Summits, together with the ambitious upgrading of the EU-Africa dialogue from 
a “long-standing partnership” (COM: 2003: 0316) to a Joint EU-Africa Strategic 
Partnership in 2007, on the one side, and the declared ambitions of the EU to project 
itself in the world as a global actor, on the other side, raise questions. These questions 
suggest that multiple motives have originated the present development in the EU-Africa 
Strategy. In this analysis I seek to explain these multiple motives and their possible 
impacts on the future development of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 
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1.1. Problem formulation 
The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the EU Strategy for Africa, from 
the first Summit held in Cairo in 2000 to the second Summit held in Lisbon in 2007, 
with the aim to explain what has motivated the mix of change and conservatism that can 
be found in the EU-Africa dialogue in that period of seven years. This study further 
aims to establish how the new joint strategy, adopted in the Lisbon Declaration, marks a 
new era or rather a shift in the relations between the EU and Africa. I will do this 
through a discussion of the EU influence on this development, to establish if primarily 
due to economic interests or ideas based on political ambitions. 
 
At a first glance the Lisbon Summit agenda might give the impression that not much if 
anything has changed effectively over the last decades in the EU-Africa-relation. In 
order to determine what might have changed in the relation between the two Continents, 
this paper analyses the Lisbon Summit agenda and compares it to the Cairo Summit 
agenda, on the one hand, underlining new points as opposed to already existing ones; 
and on the other hand, identifying stable elements as opposed to new areas of 
cooperation. Key Commission documents on the EU-Africa dialogue from 2003 and 
2005 will be drawn into the analysis to identify elements of continuity and change in the 
EU-Africa dialogue and also check for compliance and consistency with different 
external policies and instruments aimed at Africa as a region. The Summit Strategies 
will be held up against a thesis arguing that old ambitions of the European Community 
to become a significant actor on the international scene lie behind the tendency to 
integrate the EU’s different foreign policy instruments towards Africa. 
 
To narrow the scope of the investigation, it will seek to answer three questions: 
 
• Which EU political arguments or discourse have been presented in favour of 
the development of a Joint Africa Strategy? 
• Has it been primarily interests, ideas or political discourse that have 
dominated and influenced the evolution of the EU Africa policy? 
• Which importance will the Joint Africa Strategy have for the EU’s 
positioning as a significant actor on the international scene? 
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1.2. Structure and delimitation of the subject 
The thesis is structured in three parts. 
 
Part one is divided in two chapters that present theoretical framework considered 
relevant for the discussion of the interests and ambitions that have motivated and 
influenced the development of the EU-Africa cooperation from the 2000 Summit in 
Cairo to the 2007 Summit in Lisbon. 
 
Part two measures the distance of the EU’s Africa policy from Cairo to Lisbon. It 
studies the EU-Africa Summit Strategies, and based on a comparative analysis of the 
agendas, it uses the theoretical framework to discuss underlying interests and ambitions 
considered relevant for the evolution of the EU’s Africa Policy; it presents several 
theories about its evolution and discusses Africa in the EU security debate. 
 
Part three deals with the EU’s Africa Policy considered in a wider EU strategic context. 
It links the EU’s Africa Policy to several parallel EU Strategies related to security, 
energy and globalisation. It provides a global discussion of the various strategies 
considered relevant for the evolution of the EU’s Africa Policy and concludes the 
findings of the investigation of which interests and ambitions have motivated and 
influenced the development of the EU-Africa cooperation from the 2000 Summit in 
Cairo to the 2007 Summit in Lisbon. 
 
The focus of this thesis is limited to this development between 2000 and 2007, with the 
exception of a brief reference to the historical perspective of the EU-Africa partnership 
for contextual purposes. The scope of the investigation is to investigate the interests and 
ambitions that have motivated the development of the EU-Africa relation towards a 
Joint Africa-EU Partnership Strategy from an EU political perspective. An important 
delimitation of the subject is thus that the investigation does not account for African 
perspectives. 
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1.3. Theory and methodology 
I have chosen political integration theory as a theoretical framework to provide the 
background for understanding the development in the EU’s policy towards Africa, and 
an important element to reach this understanding will be a discussion of factors, 
interests and ideas determining the behaviour the Member States. 
 
Although historically, several EU Member States have held colonies in the African 
Continent and many bonds remain strong in the form of bilateral agreements and 
development aid, this paper, however, will focus on the EU policies and behaviour as a 
whole rather than scrutinize single Member States interests and single State behaviour, 
based on the principle that the EU is constituted by single Member States. 
 
The presentation of European integration theory is first considered in the context of 
world politics in an era of globalization (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 1-13) to provide a first 
overview of world politics in a globalized era, where an increased economically and 
technologically led interconnectedness between societies in the world have created an 
evermore interdependent world economy in terms of trade and finances; and where 
global risks in areas such as health and environment have put an increasing emphasis on 
the obligation of the more developed economies to develop global polities and include 
the developing and least developed economies in the world economy.  
 
Four main theoretical views (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 3) that have dominated the study 
of world politics will be presented to show different and rivalling views: each one 
focusing on different aspects of world politics and claiming to provide a better solution 
to world problems. The theoretical views will provide the background for understanding 
the following presentation of three meta-theoretical positions (Smith and Owens: 2005: 
274), which will constitute the actual basis for the empirical analysis of this thesis to 
answer the three above mentioned questions. 
 
Then I will present these meta-theoretical positions in comparative and international 
politics: rationalism, reflectivism, and constructivism. The three positions will be the 
basis for the empirical investigation, but before proceeding with the analysis of the EU-
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Africa relations, they will be seen in the light of the three main or traditional EU 
integration theories: functionalism, federalism, and intergovernmentalism. 
Methodically, I have chosen to investigate the development of the EU’s Africa policies 
on the background of the theoretical framework, based on the three different above 
mentioned meta-theoretical positions to discuss the EU’ motivations, to establish 
whether they are primarily based on economic interests, or whether they represent 
political ideas or ambitions, or simply a given political discourse. 
 
The empirical analysis will rest on three main assumptions drawn from the meta-
theoretical positions: first, Moravcsik’s thesis, from a rationalist position, that EU 
integration reflects primarily the pursuit of economic interests by the Member States 
when coordinating their policies, and thus are not primarily geopolitically determined; 
second, Alexander Wendt’s thesis, from a social constructivist position, that Member 
States act on a combination of interests and ideas; and third, from a critical discourse 
analytical position, based on Norman Fairclough’s model, that discourse is important in 
constructing social realities and identities.  
 
This will provide the theoretical background for understanding Member States’ 
behaviour and thus the EU’s behaviour. The objective of this thesis is to establish 
plausible causes for the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy. This is done by looking at 
the strategies resulting from the two EU-Africa Summits and discussing them on the 
basis of meta-theoretical positions, seeking to explain the evolution from differing 
perspectives, and analyse whether the motivations have been primarily motivated in 
interests, ideas, or identity. Part One provides the theoretical and analytical framework. 
In Part Two, the empirical analysis of the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy is 
measured against theses on the EU’s foreign policy ambitions, on how these are being 
played out in Africa: assumptions that “the development of the CFSP and not least the 
ESDP is particularly crucial for fulfilling the global ambitions of the Union” (Olsen: 
2007: 1) are investigated to test their validity; and the Africa policy is then measured 
against parallel EU strategies based on the assumption that the strategy must be seen in 
the context of a wider EU strategy; in part Three it is analyzed in a wider context based 
on the EU’s positioning in the world through which it is assumed that it seeks the 
projection of its internal policies in order to influence the multilateral institutional 
system on a global basis. 
 16 
 
1.4. Theoretical and methodological considerations 
The investigation in Parts Two and Three is based largely on material collected from 
official sites available on the Internet, which can be gathered in three main groups: the 
first is linked to the EU-Africa dialogue and the EU-Africa Joint Strategy, key 
documents such as issue papers and other related documents as well as key documents 
linked to parallel EU strategies; the second encompasses documents collected from the 
European Commission Site on the President and the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the EU and Africa in a context of 
globalization; and the third includes material from think tanks, institutes for 
international strategies, such as the European Center for Policy Development 
Management (ECPDM) and the European Policy Centre (EPC). 
 
The choice of placing the theoretical and analytical framework early in the thesis is 
designed to provide the guideline for the investigation. 
 
2. European integration theory and world politics 
The theoretical framework of European integration theory is considered relevant as 
a canvas for the discussion of which interests and ambitions have motivated and 
influenced the development of EU policies. However, when analysing the development 
from the 2000 Cairo Summit to the 2007 Lisbon Summit, the discussion of European 
integration theory is here seen in the context of world politics in an era of globalization, 
not to discuss integration but to give an overview of European politics in this context. 
 
European integration theory offers explanations as to why Member States have chosen 
to coordinate core policies and to hand over sovereignty within an international 
institution. Traditionally, European integration theory is divided into three models: 
functionalism, federalism, and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik: 1998: 3-9). 
 
Functionalism views European integration as a deterministic process and a central idea 
is the “spill-over” mechanism, by which Member States are drawn into mutual 
cooperation. Examples of this are the development of common policies in the areas of 
customs, trade, markets, agriculture, money, economics, foreign policy and defence. 
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Federalism assents on successive Treaty modifications as the driving forces for 
European integration towards a constitutional treaty and the creation of a European 
Parliament which shall have the same power as a national parliament and appoint a 
European government. Characteristic for federalist theory is the division of power and 
the principle of subsidiarity. The cooperation is layered in local, regional, state, 
interstate and EU levels. Only what cannot be dealt with locally is to be transferred to a 
higher level and treated there. Federalism contains a positive theory on how the 
cooperation is, and a normative theory on how the cooperation should be. 
 
Intergovernmentalism views the Member States as the main actors and driving forces 
for European integration and assumes that governments enter intergovernmental 
negotiations and agreements based on their national interests. There is no automatic 
logic of integration: it only takes place if the Member States have an interest in this. 
 
When speaking of European integration theory in the context of world politics in a 
globalized era, it must first be established what is understood by globalization and 
world politics. The term “globalization” is “controversial” (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 2), 
because there are many conceptions of what exactly this means. The main actual 
assumption is that globalization has brought on changes in world politics and political 
and economic patterns. The term “world politics” (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 2) is more 
inclusive than a term such as “international politics”, which indicates relations between 
nation-states, and is chosen due to the increasing importance of emerging relations 
between transnational actors, such as international organizations, governments, 
institutions, multinational companies, also as a product of globalization . 
 
Smith and Baylis understand globalization as an increased economically and 
technologically led interconnectedness between societies in the world: the pace of 
economic transformation, which has created an evermore interdependent world 
economy in terms of trade and finances; new communications technologies, which have 
changed traditional conceptions of time and space; global risks in areas such as health 
and environment, and the emergence of global polities and also a cosmopolitan culture, 
which implies that people increasingly think globally and experience a greater cultural 
homogeneity. Globalization is thus thought of as the process of an increasing 
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interconnectedness between peoples and societies all over the world, and people having 
an increased awareness of the world “shrinking” (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 1-13). 
 
Smith and Baylis explain that the study of world politics has been dominated by four 
main theoretical views: realism (as opposed to idealism); liberalism or pluralism; 
structuralism also known as Marxist or world system; and a more recent view: social 
constructivism. These views are briefly presented in the following. 
 
2.1. Four main theoretical views in the study of world politics 
The four main theoretical views: realism, liberalism, structuralism, and social 
constructivism represent different and competing world views: each one focuses on 
different aspects of world politics and each claim to give a better explanation than the 
rival theories as to the main political problems of the world and their solutions. (Smith 
and Baylis: 2005:2-13): 
 
Realism focuses on the power relations between states, each trying to maximize their 
interests in a game of bargaining and interests. Diplomacy is a key mechanism, but if 
cooperation is not possible then military force is the most important tool to implement 
foreign policies, so conflict is a constant potential. Neo-realism, a variant of Realism, 
sees the structure of the international political system moving towards multipolarity (as 
opposed to bipolarity during the cold war), which will affect behaviour of States (Smith 
and Baylis: 2005: 4-5). 
Liberalism focuses on a wider set of interactions between States and non-state actors, 
and rejects the Realist notion of war as the natural condition of world politics. 
Interdependence between sovereign states is an important feature. Military force is 
important, but the order in world politics emerges from the dynamics of layers of 
governing settings such as international rules and agreed norms. Interstate cooperation 
through international settings is a key mechanism. Ideas matter and underlying thoughts 
are a belief in progress, the perfectibility of Humans and the necessity of democracy 
(Smith and Baylis: 2005: 5). 
Structuralism focuses on the patterns of the world-economy: world politics takes place 
within a world capitalist economy, in which the key actors are classes not states. The 
main political patterns in world politics are determined by the dominance of the power 
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of international capitalism. State sovereignty is important, but economic rather than 
military terms determine the world order (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 5-6). 
 
Constructivism focuses on the ways in which different social structures and processes 
can be developed and argues that world politics structures, processes, identities, and 
interests are changeable through the remake of the social conditions and human 
progress. This approach emerged in the late 1980s in the light of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet empire and has gained increased importance 
since the mid-1990s (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 6). 
 
Smith and Baylis present the main four theories to explain the context of world politics, 
not to discuss which model is the “right” one (Smith and Baylis: 2005: 2). However, 
they see an important trend resulting from globalization: increased interconnectedness 
and economic interdependence have made force less usable in favour of a greater 
tendency to state bargaining with other actors, negotiation rather than the old power-
politics model game in international relations. Globalization has increased in the 
political sphere and multilateral cooperation is now also required on issues such as 
global warming. And there is a trend towards hybridization of domestic-foreign affairs. 
 
2.2. Three meta-theoretical positions in the study of world politics 
A changing world marked by the end of the Cold War, increasing globalization and 
the rise of non-state actors have turned the explanatory power of old theories obsolete in 
understanding present world politics, and “new approaches” (Smith and Owens in 
Baylis: 2005: 275) have been proposed as being more relevant, summed up in three 
meta-theoretical positions, meta-theoretical meaning that they are above any particular 
theory, drawn from the social sciences: rationalism, which are versions of the Realist 
and Liberal theories; alternative (in that they reject Rationalist theories) approaches, 
such as post-colonialism and historical sociology; and social constructivist theories, 
which propose to bridge the gap between the other two in trying to speak to both 
rationalist and alternative approaches. 
 
Using the three meta-theoretical positions as a guiding theoretical framework in this 
investigation, I will take a starting point in Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism that belongs to Rationalism; Alexander Wendt’s social 
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constructivism; and Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis that falls under 
Reflectivism. 
 
2.2.1. Liberal intergovernmentalism 
Liberal intergovernmentalism offers an alternative integration theory building on 
three theories: intergovernmentalism, liberal theory and neo-institutionalism. 
Intergovernmentalism has been described above as a traditional European integration 
theory. Liberal theory assumes that when, in any given foreign political context, 
governments advance national interests, different social groups in the domestic arena 
determine these interests. Neo-institutionalism deals with the development of 
international institutions and whether or not States hand over sovereignty to these 
institutions (Smith and Owens: 2005: 272-275). 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism holds “that European integration was a series of rational 
adaptations by national leaders to constraints and opportunities stemming from the 
evolution of an interdependent world economy, the relative power of states in the 
international system, and the potential for international institutions to bolster the 
credibility of interstate commitments.” (Moravcsik: 1998: 472) 
 
From a rationalist framework based analysis of primarily German, French and British 
policies and decision makings regarding major agreements (or “major bargains” as 
Moravcsik refers to them) such as the Rome Treaty, the Common Agricultural Policy, 
The Single European Act, and the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), 
Moravcsik reaches three conclusions: first, that economic interests have tended to 
prevail over geopolitical goals; second, that interstate bargaining outcomes have 
reflected the relative power of nation-states rather than being the result of the 
interventions of supranational officials; and third, that government choices to pool and 
delegate sovereignty would occur “where governments seek to compel compliance by 
foreign governments (or, in some cases, future domestic governments) with a strong 
temptation to defect” (Moravcsik: 1998: 9) rather than for commitment reasons to 
European federalism ideology. 
 
Morawcsik argues that underlying causes to European integration are based on social-
scientific theories of national preferences, interstate bargaining and institutional choice 
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and claims that “the broad line of European integration since 1955 reflects three factors: 
patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of important 
governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments.” 
(Moravcsik: 1998: 3) The drive for European regional integration is mainly based on 
national economic interests and works by the following pattern: first national interests 
are defined, then national leaders defend their interests entering in a negotiating process 
with other Member States, and finally the institutional build-up is determined. 
Moravcsik explains European integration as a “…series of rational adaptations by 
national leaders to constraints and opportunities stemming from the evolution of an 
interdependent world economy, the relative power of states in the international system, 
and the potential for international institutions to bolster the credibility of interstate 
commitments” (Moravcsik: 1998: 472). 
 
Moravcsik argues that “…a tripartite explanation of integration – economic interests, 
relative power, credible commitments – accounts for the form, substance, and timing of 
major steps toward European integration. Most fundamental of these was commercial 
interest. European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by 
national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests”  (Moravcsik: 1998: 4). 
According to Moravcsik, it was basically due to a need of adaptation to technology and 
economic policy trends that Member States coordinated their policies. 
 
Concerning theories of foreign economic policy, Moravcsik offers an alternative theory 
to the idea that European economic integration was pursued primarily “to counter 
geopolitical threats and realize geopolitical goals”. Instead he argues that the results 
from the case studies reflected primarily economic interests, which would tend to 
prevail over geopolitical goals. “The dominant motivations of governments in the EC 
decisions studied here reflected… pressures to coordinate policy responses to rising 
opportunities for profitable economic exchange, in particular growing intra-industry 
trade and capital movements” (Moravcsik: 1998:6). Although not entirely insignificant, 
geopolitical goals are secondary and would only be considered “where economic 
interests were weak, diffuse, or indeterminate” (Moravcsik: 1998:7) and have only been 
significant where “costs and benefits of cooperation were uncertain, balanced or weak” 
(Moravcsik: 1998 477). 
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Moravcsik holds that states will enter into cooperation largely on the basis of economic 
interests and that their motivation to delegate and pool sovereignty is to be found in the 
desire for more credible commitments rather than in ideology. And although 
geopolitical and ideological factors are attributed some importance in influencing the 
acts of government, they are only secondary when it comes to explaining the European 
integration path. Geopolitical considerations would tend to be important in foreign 
policy matters and concerns about security and sovereignty. And geopolitical factors 
would tend to be “more ideational than objective and often connected with prestigious 
national leaders” (Moravcsik: 1998:478). 
 
2.2.2. Social constructivism 
Alexander Wendt adopts a more “holistic” view to explain European integration: 
he argues that interests are made up of ideas, and although he does not claim that ideas 
are more important than power or interests, he considers it vital to recognize their 
importance to understand the dynamics of foreign policy and systemic change. 
 
“The claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are 
autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as important and 
determining as before. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effect they 
do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. Power and interest explanations presuppose 
ideas, and to that extent are not rivals to ideational explanations at all”. (Wendt, 1999: 
135) 
 
Where Moravcsik primarily identifies economic interests as the driving forces for the 
behaviour of Member States in the integration process, Wendt holds that although 
interests partially explain the behaviour of politicians, these interests are made up of 
ideas: they are the basis for the development of the interests. 
 
In order to understand how these ideas are shaped and passed on, critical discourse 
analysis offers an explanation to how the use of language helps construct social practice, 
identity, social relations and systems of knowledge and significance. 
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2.2.3. Critical discourse analysis 
Norman Fairclough has developed a model of critical discourse analysis, which 
he applies to political discourse. Fairclough attributes importance to the use of language 
in influencing knowledge, beliefs and identities, in shaping representations of the world. 
Because language has the power to create identity it is important to analyse critically. 
But whereas linguistic analysis focuses only on text, then discursive analysis is also 
concerned with practices: discourse practices as well as sociocultural practices.  
 
Fairclough defines discourse as “a particular way of constructing a particular domain of 
social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 76), and the framework of discourse analysis is 
useful in establishing ideational functions in representations, in the manipulation of 
ideology and identity. Discourse analysis aims at disclosing conceptions of the world 
and it can be used to understand the dynamics in social relationships between politicians 
and population. In defining the analytical framework for sociocultural practice, 
Fairclough differentiates three aspects: “economic, political (concerned with power and 
ideology), and cultural (concerned with questions of value and identity)” (Fairclough: 
1995: 62). 
 
The element of power relations is central in the discourse analytical approach: “Political 
discourse provides the clearest illustration of the constitutive power of discourse: it 
reproduces or changes the social world by reproducing or changing people’s 
representations of it and the principles of classification which underlies them. It also 
clearly shows the inseparability of ideational and interpersonal processes in 
discourse…” (Fairclough: 1995: 182). Also central to Fairclough’s model is the 
assumption that discourse reproduces and shapes social relations and identities. 
 
Critical discourse analysis is included in the analytical framework on the presumption 
that EU political discourses present the EU and the world in a certain way and present 
political acts as necessary and rational, which then influence the political sphere and the 
public understanding for the rationale behind these acts. The discourse of highly placed 
politicians will be recognized as expert statements, and this fact alone will contribute to 
influence the political agenda and the acceptance of the discourse as being “true”. It is 
also important to take into consideration the social and political context in which a text 
is produced, which will allow for a wider analysis of its production and interpretation. 
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2.3. Synthesis of the theoretical framework 
Three important trends have resulted from globalization: one is a trend to 
hybridization of domestic-foreign affairs owing to the fact that globalization has been 
strengthened in the political sphere and because multilateral cooperation is increasingly 
required on matters of global concern. A second trend is a changing view on world 
politics from a primarily geopolitical perspective to one considering global social 
relations. And a third trend is that increased interconnectedness and economic 
interdependence has made force less usable in favour of a greater tendency to state 
bargaining with other actors, negotiation rather than the old power-politics model game 
in international relations. 
 
Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism, with basis on a rationalist framework, 
reaches three conclusions: first, that economic interests tend to prevail over geopolitical 
goals; second, that interstate bargaining outcomes, rather than being the result of the 
interventions of supranational officials, reflect the relative power of nation-states; and 
third, that governments choose to pool and delegate sovereignty not so much because of  
commitment reasons to European federalism ideology, but rather in attempts to “compel 
compliance by foreign governments with a strong temptation to defect”.. 
 
According to Wendt’s social constructivist theory, interests can help explain the 
motives behind politicians’ behaviour, but it is the ideas behind that form the basis for 
the further development of these interests. Because power and interests presuppose 
ideas, they are in fact compatible with ideas and not rivalling to ideational explanations. 
 
According to Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis it is through language and 
discourse that identity, social relations and knowledge is constructed, and the social 
world is a discursive construction. Discourse influences the interpretation of concrete 
situations, providing a framework for action and interpretative reflection, highly 
relevant in understanding the dynamics at play in politics. Throughout the study the 
critical discourse analysis frequently refers to a certain type of discourse defined in this 
context as an institutional discourse which by its repeated use forms a certain kind of 
universe of beliefs that may well differ from the factual reality. 
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2.4. Analytical framework 
In creating an analytical framework to understand the evolution of the EU’s foreign 
policy towards Africa a “hybrid" of the three meta-theoretical approaches may prove 
efficient. Interests, ideas, and discourse, are all elements closely interwoven which 
together influence the projection of the European Union in the world. 
 
Africa represents multiple interests for the EU; it is argued that Europe has economic, 
political, social and security interests in responding to Africa’s needs: “A more stable 
and secure Africa would help reduce refugee flows to Europe. A more resurgent Africa 
would also be an important economic and political partner for Europe. The continent 
has abundant natural resources and is potentially a huge market for European goods and 
services” (EPC: 2005: 15). It is also argued that the EU has a special interest in being or 
becoming an important international actor and that this interests is closely linked to the 
concept of a “European identity”, associated with values as democracy, soft-power, 
social welfare, peaceful conflict solutions (Olsen: 2007). 
  
It is assumed that in the dynamics of institutions and ideas in EU policy-making, the 
institutions play an important role in shaping norms, values and conventions and in 
helping to construct a shared belief system, discourse is a key instrument. It is also 
assumed that there is a methodological advantage of applying discourse analysis to 
political discourse: it is possible to stick to discourse as discourse and by “zooming in” 
on discourse, the analysis allows for knowledge to be systematically organized, 
separated in layered constellations (Wæver: 2002: 26-33). The argument is that because 
discourse is made up of statements, then focusing on texts allows for identifying 
structures and meaning in the discursive universe, and an advantage of a layered 
discursive structure is its ability to specify change within continuity. 
 
The underlying conceptual framework used in this paper is that the combined analysis 
of interests, ideas and discourse is useful in understanding the dynamics in play in the 
European Union’s positioning in the world and the evolution of the Union’s Africa 
policy. It is argued that the two are intrinsically associated. One the one hand, the 
interests of the EU cannot be seen isolated from the national interests and internal 
cooperation in the EU, and on the other hand, the EU’s external actions and projection 
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of itself in the world cannot be seen independently from global challenges and world 
politics. 
 
2.5. Summary 
The scope of this thesis is to study the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy in a 
timeframe of seven years between 2000 and 2007. The study aims to disclose which 
dominant forces in the EU have influenced the evolution of a Joint Strategic Partnership 
between the two continents.  On the one side, the study will investigate key documents 
in the EU-Africa dialogue over these seven years to determine which interests, ideas, 
and discourse have been dominant in the evolution of the Africa strategy; on the other 
hand, it will investigate parallel EU strategies over the same period of time. The 
argument is that the Africa policy, important as it is on its own, must be seen in a wider 
political context in which the EU aims to project itself in the world as a powerful 
international actor, based on the EU’s stated ambition of playing a stronger role. It is 
assumed that this strategy is based on ideas of strong interests for the EU’s internal 
market in a globalized world, and that political discourse has influenced this evolution. 
Finally, based on the conclusion of the analysis an overall pattern for dominating trends 
in the Africa policy is established and seen in a wider context: a global strategy by 
which the EU is externalizing its internal market to a global scale and by which it is 
“shifting into a higher gear” (De Gucht: 2006: 8) its foreign policy moving from a 
traditional external relations framework based on development policy and humanitarian 
assistance instruments to a formal foreign policy in order to influence an effective 
global multilateral system. 
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PART TWO 
The EU’s Africa Policy from Cairo to Lisbon 
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3. Introduction 
The EU has had a special relationship with Africa since its early beginnings. 
Already the Schuman Declaration in 1950 that led to the creation of what is now the 
European Union mentioned the development of the African continent as one of its 
essential tasks, upon proposing that Franco-German production of coal and steel be 
placed under a common High Authority:  
 
“With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of 
its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent. In this way, there 
will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the 
establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may 
grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by 
sanguinary divisions” (Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950).  
 
A pooled production would ensure a common ground for economic development, 
make war between France and Germany unthinkable, and would provide the member 
countries with a production which would be offered to the world to raise living 
standards and promote peace. African interests had the potential to glue together 
Member States, many of which were colonial powers in Africa, an important source of 
raw materials such as iron required for the production of steel. 
 
Fifty years later, the EU institutionalized its political relations with Africa through the 
realization of the First EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo. In 2003, a second Summit was 
cancelled, however, an EU-Africa Dialogue was launched; in 2005, an EU Strategy for 
Africa followed; and finally, the second EU-Africa Summit was held in Lisbon in 2007. 
 
The purpose of this second part is to measure the distance of the EU’s Africa policy 
from Cairo to Lisbon. A first chapter compares the Summit Strategies to establish 
elements of change and stability in the political agenda. A second chapter analyzes 
contributing factors influencing the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy, and 
investigates theses on underlying motives for this with a particular emphasis on the 
CSFP and the ESDP initiatives in Africa. A third chapter analyzes the Africa strategy in 
a context of parallel EU strategies in areas such as security, energy, and climate change. 
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4. EU-Africa Summit Strategies and Agendas 
The purpose of this chapter is to measure the distance between the first Summit held 
in Cairo in 2000 and the second Summit held in Lisbon in 2007. 
 
4.1. The Cairo Summit 
The first EU-Africa Summit in Cairo (Egypt), in April 2000, counted the 
participation of the Heads of State and Government of African States and the EU as 
well as the President of the European Commission, the Secretary General of the Council 
of the EU/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and a 
representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The Summit was co-
chaired by the Organization of the African Union (OAU) and the EU. 
 
The Cairo Summit Agenda was organized around 5 main headings: 1) Economic Issues, 
2) Integrating Africa into the World Economy, 3) Human Rights, Democratic Principles 
and Institutions, Good Governance and the Rule of Law, 4) Peace-building, Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, and 5) Development Issues. 
 
The Summit resulted in a strategy (the Cairo Declaration) and a plan of action, (the 
Cairo Plan of Action), which set off a more structured political dialogue in foreseeing a 
follow-up mechanism on several levels: at the level of Heads of State and Government 
(Summits), at the level of minister (in between the Summits), and finally at Senior 
Official’s level (in a bi-regional group). 
 
The Summit further foresaw the scheduling of a second Summit to take place in Europe 
in 2003, which ended up being cancelled, mainly for political reasons involving quarrels 
between Zimbabwe and Great Britain. 
 
4.1.1. The Cairo Declaration 
The discourse of the Cairo Declaration emphasizes a joint determination to 
strengthen century-long ties between Africa and Europe in the light of increasing 
globalization. The areas of cooperation cover political, economic, social, cultural and 
linguistic areas, which it is stated “… have developed on the basis of shared values of 
strengthening representative and participatory democracy, respect for human rights and  
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fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, pluralism, international peace 
and security, political stability and confidence among nations”. 
 
The Declaration aims at adding a new strategic dimension for the cooperation in 
creating an “effective framework for promoting a constructive dialogue on economic, 
political, social and development issues”, building upon already existing “links of 
political, economic and cultural understanding”. 
 
The Declaration then addresses each of the above mentioned 5 main headings, including 
a rationale for each strategic priority and priority action. 
 
Under Economic Issues, a propitious climate is to be created for strengthening the 
process of Regional Economic Co-operation and Integration in Africa, under the 
rationale that there is, on the one hand an important interrelation between regional 
integration and political stability, peace and security, and on the other hand that regional 
integration can contribute to a more beneficial inclusion in the world economy. 
 
The following priority, Integrating Africa into the World Economy, holds a series of 
sub-points: Trade, Private Sector Development, Investment, Resources for 
Development, Infrastructural Problem and Industrial Base, Research and Technology, 
External Debt, and Cooperation in International Fora. 
 
Roughly the underlying rationale can be summed up in these terms: Africa faces a 
marginalization in the world economy and is stuck in a vicious poverty trap: 
macroeconomic instability and structural rigidities are counterproductive to the efforts 
aiming at poverty alleviation; very high growth rates for external debt triggers a decline 
in investors’ confidence, which results in declining foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows and negatively affects the continent’s economic growth, sustainable development 
and poverty eradication. Additionally Africa faces infrastructural problems in areas such 
as water supply, energy, transports and communications, knowledge, research and 
technology plus a weak or inexistent industrial and technological base. 
 
The next priority Human Rights, democratic principles and institutions, good 
governance and the rule of law includes themes such as civil society, migration, 
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xenophobia, refugees and internally displaced persons. Again there is recognition of the 
interrelation between democracy, development and the protection of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights. In the light of massive violations of human rights and law, 
acts of racism, genocide and ethnic cleansing taken place there is recognition of both 
governmental responsibility and civil society participation in protecting human rights 
and recognition of the vast consequences armed conflicts has on a continental scale in 
terms of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as migration, brain drain and 
the rights of women and children. 
 
The strategic priority of Peace-building, Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution recognise the correlation between socio-economic development and peace, 
security, stability and justice. Included are issues linked to situations of disarmament, 
post-conflict assistance, demobilisation and reintegration; terrorism; arms and weapons; 
landmines; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Treaty; and Africa’s conflicts, 
which cause great losses of human lives and destruction of property and infrastructure 
and “threaten peace, stability, regional and international security and hinder the 
aspirations of African peoples to peace, prosperity and development…” (2000: 9). 
 
Finally under the priority Development Issues are included: challenges to sustainable 
development in Africa and poverty eradication; education; health; environment; food 
security; drug abuse and trafficking; and cultural issues. The primary challenge is the 
widespread poverty and linked to poverty reduction strategies are investments in human 
resources (education and health), food security (access and availability), and 
environment (rural and urban development strategies). The problem of drug abuse and 
trafficking is recognised as reinforcing crime, spreading diseases and reducing the 
productivity of human resources and the need for strengthened cooperation is stressed. 
The issue of cultural goods stolen or exported illicitly from Africa is the last 
development issue point aiming at cultural cooperation between Africa and Europe. 
 
4.1.2. The Cairo Plan of Action 
The preamble of the Cairo Plan of Action states a political commitment “to work 
towards a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and 
Europe”; it establishes a series of priority actions; and it foresees a follow-up 
mechanism to give impetus to the Plan of Action and to monitor its implementation. 
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4.2. The Lisbon Summit 
The Second EU-Africa Summit was held in Lisbon in December 2008, where EU 
and African Heads of State and Government formally1 adopted a new Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy containing a reinforced political partnership and cooperation in a series of areas 
such as peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade and regional 
integration, and key development issues such as environmental sustainability and 
climate change, migration, gender equality, and infrastructure. Together with the Joint 
Strategy a First Action Plan was adopted to assure its implementation, and a Summit 
Declaration (the Lisbon Declaration): a mission statement of the new partnership on the 
road to peace, stability, a state of law, progress and development 
 
The Lisbon Summit Agenda was organized around 5 main themes, 1) Peace and 
Security; 2) Governance and Human Rights; 3) Trade, infrastructures and development; 
4) Energy and climate change; and 5) Migration. Each theme was introduced by two 
keynote speakers, one from each Continent. The initial interventions on the first theme 
were held by the French President and the President of Gabon; the second theme was 
introduced by the South African President and the German Chancellor; the third by the 
Italian President and the President of Burkina Faso; the theme of energy and climate 
change was introduced by the President of Uganda and the Danish Prime Minister, 
while the Spanish Government President and the Leader of the Libyan Revolution made 
the initial interventions on the theme of migrations. Both the opening statements and the 
following interventions from the countries underlined that the Summit marked a new 
era in the relation between the two continents, a paradigmatic shift in the EU-Africa 
relations and a new partnership between equals. The positive development trends in 
Africa were stressed and climate, trade and African migration were dominant themes in 
the interventions. The Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates, co-chair of the Summit 
as Chair of the EU Presidency, opened the series of introductory speeches preceding the 
keynote speeches. Sócrates stressed that the ambition of a successful implementation of 
the Joint Strategy and First Action Plan would demand a taboo-less dialogue on the five 
main Summit themes: Peace and Security, mentioning the crises in Somalia and Darfur; 
Governance and Human Rights, ”exclusive of no society, and central to the Agenda”; 
Development Issues, aiming to reach the MDG; Climate Change and Global 
                                                
1The text was endorsed by the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, in Accra, 31st October 2007 and discussed at 
the Sharm-el-Sheik Foreign Minister Meeting on 5-6th December 2007. 
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Challenges, with the aim to reach a global agreement with common goals and a 
collaboration; and finally Migration, which Sócrates referred to as the theme that had 
enjoyed the less political cooperation and dialogue, however one that should be a 
priority in the cooperation between the two Continents. 
 
4.2.1. The Lisbon Declaration 
The Lisbon Declaration sums up the political context for the second Summit in 
relation to the first Summit in Cairo seven years earlier: institutional changes in Africa, 
an enlarged European Union, and new global challenges such as energy and climate 
changes, migrations or gender issues, and stresses that these factors together with a clear 
conscience of the vital interdependence in today’s world with an emerging need to 
jointly address these main challenges provide the political background for stating a 
series of key deliverables, which include: the fulfilment of the Millenium Development 
Goals (MDG); the founding of a solid architecture of peace and security in Africa; a 
strengthening of investment, growth and prosperity through regional integration and a 
tightening of economic bonds; the promotion of good governance and Human Rights; 
and the creation of opportunities to form a global governance in an open and 
multilateral framework. 
 
In order to obtain concrete results and to reach “early results on key deliverables”, the 
Declaration establishes a strategy containing a series of prioritary actions selected for an 
initial period (2008-2010), leading up to the Third Summit to be held in Africa in 2010. 
A monitoring mechanism has been created to ensure the fulfilment of the objectives. 
The parties agree upon implementing these prioritary actions in the context of specific 
“Africa-EU Partnerships”, focusing on actions at regional, continental or global level, 
considered more competitively advantageous compared to actions at national level.  
 
4.2.2. The Lisbon Joint Strategy 
An overall aim of the objectives of the Joint Strategy is to support African 
countries in their efforts to attain all Millenium Development Goals by the year 2015. 
The underlying idea is that without political stability, peace and democracy it will not 
be possible to create a stable economic market and attract foreign direct investment, and 
without infrastructures it will not be possible to create sustainable economic growth, 
without which it will not be possible to achieve the MDG in Africa by 2015. 
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The Strategy encompass four broadly defined clusters of policy priorities and addresses 
the areas of peace and security; governance and Human Rights; trade and regional 
integration; and key development issues. Eight strategic partnerships were adopted in 
the areas of: 1) peace and security; 2) democratic governance and human rights; 3) 
trade, regional integrations and infrastructure; 4) the Millenium Development Goals; 5) 
energy; 6) climate change; 7) migration, mobility and employment; and 8) science, 
information society and space. The political rationale behind each strategic partnership 
largely carries on from Cairo, however it is stressed that in the light of new global 
challenges, the strategy embraces a shared vision on common values and principles; by 
establishing a political partnership of equals the aim is to address both bilateral issues 
and common global challenges while at the same time encouraging multilateral 
channels. 
 
In the area of peace and security, the underlying rationale is that there is room for an 
enlarged cooperation on the one side to foster peace and security in both Africa and 
Europe, but also to address global issues of common concern, through African capacity 
building, flexible funding for African-led peace support operations, institutional 
cooperation between the two continents and linked to the security agenda. 
 
The rationale behind the promoting of democratic values and Human Rights in the 
strategic partnership is to enhance the effectiveness of the multilateral system, and 
permit a more systematic and effective use of existing instruments, mechanisms and 
funding modalities. 
 
The area of trade and regional integration is linked to a rationale aiming at the 
promotion of global economic governance, a sustained inclusion of Africa in the world 
economy, and enhanced coordination of African and EU positions in international fora. 
 
The underlying rationale for the area of key development issues is linked to the 
achievement of the MDG through continued commitment to enhanced aid effectiveness. 
 
4.2.3. The First Action Plan (2008-2010) 
Although an in-depth analysis of the First Action Plan falls out of the scope of 
this paper, a brief description of the plan is considered relevant for the subsequent 
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comparative analysis with the Cairo Strategy in the following section to establish 
elements of change and continuity in the EU Strategy for Africa. 
 
The first three of the eight strategic partnerships are related to the first three strategy 
objectives: 1) Peace and Security; 2) Governance and Human Rights; and 3) Trade and 
Regional Integration; the last five partnerships are related to strategy objective number 
four: the Key Development Issues, which are linked to: 1) the achievement of the 
Millenium Development Goals, 2) energy, 3) climate change, 4) migration, mobility and 
employment, and 5) science, information society and Space. Under each specific 
partnership are specified a selection of prioritary actions. 
 
The Partnership on Peace and Security contains three priority actions: 1) enhance the 
dialogue on challenges to peace and security; 2) fully operationalize the African Peace 
and Security Architecture; and 3) funding for African-led Peace Support Operations. 
The first Priority Action is to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security. The 
objective is to reach and implement common approaches on peace and security 
challenges in both Continents and globally. Through activities such as dialogue on 
peace and security related issues, crisis and conflict sensitivity analysis, exchange and 
sharing of analysis related information and the use of best practices, one expected 
outcome is to better understand the causes of conflict and their resolution. Other 
expected outcomes include strengthened cooperation on conflict prevention, 
management and resolution, long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace building; 
increased EU and African cooperation, increased cooperation and influence in global 
fora and better coordination of regional as well as continental initiatives. 
 
The Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights holds three priority 
actions: 1) enhance dialogue internationally and at global level; 2) promote the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and support the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance; and 3) strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods. 
 
The Partnership on Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure contains three priority 
actions: 1) support the African integration agenda; 2) strengthen African capacities in 
the area of rules, standards, and quality control; and 3) implement the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Partnership. 
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The Partnership on the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) prioritizes to ensure the 
finance and policy base for achieving the MDG and accelerate the achievement of the 
following MDG targets: food security, health and education. 
 
The Partnership on Energy contains one Priority Action: to implement the Energy 
Partnership to intensify cooperation on energy security and energy access. 
 
The Partnership on Climate Change presents two Priority Actions: 1) build a common 
agenda on climate change policies and cooperation; and 2) cooperate to address land 
degradation and increasing aridity, including the “Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative”. 
 
The Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment holds three Priority Actions: 
implementation of 1) the Tripoli Conference Declaration on Migration and 
Development, 2) the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings, and 3) 
the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty 
Alleviation in Africa. 
 
The eighth Partnership on Science, Information Society and Space contains three 
Priority Actions: 1) support the development of an inclusive information society in 
Africa, 2) support Science and Technology (S&T) Building on Africa and implement 
Africa’s S&T Consolidated Plan of Action; and 3) enhance cooperation on space 
applications and technology.   
 
Regarding institutional architecture and implementation, it was agreed to establish more 
frequent contacts between African and EU political leaders. 
 
4.3. Comparative analysis of the agendas 
An overall comment to the comparative Summit agenda analysis is that the Cairo 
Declaration is a “two-in-one”, declaration and strategy, whereas the two are separated 
into two documents in the Lisbon Agenda: a declaration and a strategy. Both Summits 
resulted in a plan of action. The wording of the Cairo Plan of Action is generally much 
less assertive, quantifiable and measurable, that the Lisbon version, except for its last 
part, which sets off a more structured political dialogue. In the Lisbon Strategy, each of 
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the eight strategic partnerships is presented separate from the Declaration with a 
rationale linking it to the overall objectives of the Joint Strategy. Then the Priority 
Actions are presented in the First Action Plan one by one, each stating one or more 
specific objective(s), expected outcomes, activities, actors to carry out these activities, 
and means of finance. It could be suspected that this structural difference would affect 
the comparability of the two strategies; however, a careful observation of the respective 
contents confirms the possibility of a comparative analysis. 
 
Any succession of issues on a Summit agenda is assumed to list priorities in order by 
placing the most important first and so on successively. This prioritization may be 
attributed greater or lesser importance. However, it is here assumed that there will 
always symbolically be a political interpretation associated with the sequence of the 
issues, i.e. with the order in which the themes are presented. 
 
When comparing the Summit agendas, it becomes clear that some major shifts in 
priorities have taken place. And new strategic partnerships have surfaced; the number of 
strategic partnerships has risen from five in 2000 to eight in 2007, and includes points 
such as energy, climate change, migration and Space. 
 
In the Lisbon agenda, the number one strategic partnership, peace and security, has 
moved up four “positions” in relation to the Cairo agenda. New points foresee to fully 
operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and provide funding 
for African-led Peace Support Operations. 
 
Also the number two strategic partnership, democratic governance and human rights, 
has moved up one position in relation to the Cairo agenda. New points include the 
promotion of the APRM (a novelty brought by NEPAD) and support of the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. And a new “old” point has moved 
up from a fifth position in the Cairo agenda, namely the cooperation in the area of 
cultural goods. In the Cairo agenda, cultural issues was positioned under development 
issues, however it now appears under democratic governance and human rights, 
indicating recognition of the importance the matter of returning African cultural 
heritage holds to the African continent. 
 
 38 
The third strategic partnership in the Lisbon agenda, trade, regional integration and 
infrastructure, has moved down a position in relation to the Cairo agenda. And a whole 
new point foresees a strengthening of African capacities in the area of rules, standards 
and quality control: the inclusion of this point indicates recognition of a need for 
enhanced competitiveness, for tighter measures in a global marketplace with a trend to 
standardized rules, and is also in line with the with the aims to increase African capacity 
building to take on own responsibility for sustainable production and economic growth. 
 
The fourth strategic partnership, Millenium Development Goals (MDG), have moved up 
a position in relation to the Cairo agenda, where it was denominated development 
issues. In the Lisbon Strategy the number one priority action envisages to ensure the 
finance and policy base for achieving the MDG, which is a clear recognition of the 
increased importance given to practicalities, whereas under the Cairo agenda, the 
number one priority under development issues was linked to challenges to sustainable 
development and poverty eradication, a point which has moved down to a seventh 
position in the Lisbon strategy and now figures under the strategic partnership of 
migration, mobility and employment. A further redistribution has taken place with 
respect to the prioritizing of target achievement: in the Lisbon strategy food 
achievement is listed over health and education, whereas in the Cairo strategy education 
was listed over health and then food security. 
 
The fifth strategic partnership in the Lisbon strategy is energy, which represents a 
novelty in relation to the Cairo agenda, with a single priority action previewed to 
intensify cooperation on energy security and access. This expresses a high priority 
concern for the EU, and institutionalises a strategic partnership in an area of great 
strategic importance to the EU, highly dependant on oil and gas from Russia, for 
example, with whom it also has celebrated a strategic partnership in the area of energy. 
Presently a diversification trend is evident, with rapidly expanding EU investments in 
the area of energy in Northern Africa (Morocco and Algiers) and plans to invest in solar 
energy in the Saharan desert. Also to the African continent, energy is a critical resource. 
It is noted that although Africa produces electrical power in hydro-power plants it only 
benefits a small percentage of the population, due to the low implementation of 
electrification in the rural population. Likewise, in spite of Africa holding some of the 
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more significant oil reserves in the world, most of the extraction is exported, and only a 
slight percentage benefits the local population. 
 
The sixth strategic partnership, climate change, also represents a novelty in relation to 
the Cairo strategy and testifies to the common recognition of a global challenge 
demanding global responses. It previews two priority actions: the first is to build a 
common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation, and the second is to 
cooperate to address land degradation and increased aridity, including the “Green Wall 
for the Sahara Initiative”.  
 
 The seventh strategic partnership, migration, mobility and employment, is also new in 
relation to the Cairo agenda, although in part taken from already existing points in the 
Cairo strategy, as for example migration, which figured under human rights, democratic 
principles and institutions, good governance and the rule of law. This represents on the 
one hand a move four positions down from a third position in the Cairo Declaration, but 
on the other hand it represents recognition of the importance of its vast impacts on 
development conceding it a separate strategic partnership. The priority actions regarding 
trafficking of Human beings and poverty alleviation were present in the Cairo 
Declaration under development issues in a fifth position, and likewise suffered on the 
one hand a downgrading in positioning from Cairo to Lisbon, while on the other hand 
was recognized a new importance taken from under “general” development issues to a 
new position specifically linked to the issues of migration, mobility and employment.  
 
The eight strategic partnership, science, information society and Space, is equally new 
compared to the Cairo version, although some “old” points such as capacity building 
linked to science and technology have transited from the first Summit where it showed 
under the second strategy point integrating Africa into the world economy. 
 
To sum up the comparative analysis, the following notes can be made: The Lisbon Joint 
Strategy claims to emerge in the context of a shared vision between the two Continents 
reflecting a political willingness to build a long-term strategic partnership capable of 
meeting new global challenges. It proposes a series of new approaches in order to 
respond to these challenges and to meet the objectives set forth: to move away from a 
donor-based relation towards a political partnership of equals; to build on positive 
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experiences and lessons learnt from past experiences; to move away from inherited 
negative stereotypes and instead promote more accurate images of each other; to 
promote a mutual social and cultural understanding between the peoples of the two 
Continents; to support Africa’s efforts and leadership to implement the Partnerships and 
create sound conditions for healthy social and economic development; to cooperate in 
the development of relevant policies and frameworks; to ensure coherence in bilateral 
relations, dialogue and cooperation between various countries; to strengthen the 
multilateral cooperation in response to global challenges; to integrate migrant 
communities and diasporas in the development process; and to stimulate a general 
ownership through the inclusion on civil society and local authorities. 
 
The Joint Strategy thus establishes a partnership between Africa and Europe, in which 
both parties commit themselves to address a series of objectives on strategic priorities to 
support African countries in their efforts to achieve all Millenium Development Goals 
by 2015, and in general to promote political, economic and social development and the 
inclusion of Africa in the world economy. 
 
4.4. Discussion of interests and ambitions 
It was argued that to understand the evolution of the EU’s Africa Policy we would 
have to evaluate the contribution of underlying interests, ideas and discourse. Because 
we consider that all three elements are closely interwoven, we proposed the application 
of an analytical framework based on a hybrid of three meta-theories (each focusing on 
mainly one of the elements). This argument was based on the assumption that by 
focusing on only one of the elements it would not be possible to fully understand all the 
implications of a given policy, evolution or discourse, for example to understand a 
statement such as: “A more stable and secure Africa would help reduce refugee flows to 
Europe. A more resurgent Africa would also be an important economic and political 
partner for Europe. The continent has abundant natural resources and is potentially a 
huge market for European goods and services” (EPC: 2005: 15). 
 
We recall that according to Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), economic interests 
would tend to prevail over geopolitical goals including in foreign economic policy, 
which would not be primarily to counter geopolitical threats and realize geopolitical 
goals; they would be only be significant where “costs and benefits of cooperation were 
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uncertain, balanced or weak” (Moravcsik: 1998 477). In fact, geopolitical 
considerations would tend to be important in foreign policy matters and concerns about 
security and sovereignty. And geopolitical factors would tend to be “more ideational 
than objective and often connected with prestigious national leaders” (Moravcsik: 
1998:478). Moravcsik identified a certain tendency to MS policy coordination: “The 
dominant motivations of governments’ decisions reflected “… pressures to coordinate 
policy responses to rising opportunities for profitable economic exchange, in particular 
growing intra-industry trade and capital movements” (Moravcsik: 1998:6). 
 
So from a LI approach the evolution seen in the political agenda would be attributed 
first of all to economic interests while geopolitical considerations would be a second 
explanation, tending to reflect ideational rather than objective factors.  
 
The social constructivist approach would not dismiss the importance of interests, but 
would focus more on the underlying ideas as the basis for that these interests. The peace 
and security aspect would be understood based on ideas of a social model associated 
with the core values of the EU including democracy and freedom and solidarity.  
 
The critical discourse analysis argued that to understand the dynamics at play in politics 
the focus must be on discursive construction, based on the conception that discourse 
influences the interpretation of concrete situations, and provides a framework for 
interpretative reflection and action. The critical discourse analysis approach would 
consider the evolution from an analytical perspective in which the arguments presented 
would be meant to influence the general conception of the state of facts. It would focus 
on the discursive aspect by which insisting on a link between peace and security to 
development or associating instability Africa with instability in Europe would 
manipulate the perceived perception of EU security while in reality the risks might be 
minimal or inexistent. Critical discourse analysis would reflect on the repeated use of 
expressions such as “common values” or “partnership of equals”, questioning the 
factual reality by such expressions and suppose an underlying rationale, probably with a 
hidden agenda, aiming at manipulating the general conception of facts. 
 
In analysing the strategies, to exemplify why it is argued that it is relevant to consider a 
hybrid approach rather than an LI approach or a social constructivist approach or a 
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critical discourse analysis approach when analysing the various aspects to determine 
elements of change and conservatism in the evolution of the EU’s Africa Policy, we can 
look at a discourse from the Cairo Declaration on “…areas of cooperation covering 
political, economic, social, cultural and linguistic areas, which have developed on the 
basis of shared values of strengthening representative and participatory democracy, 
respect for human rights and  fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, 
pluralism, international peace and security, political stability and confidence among 
nations”. The discourse emphasizes a joint determination to strengthen century-long ties 
between Africa and Europe in the light of increasing globalization. The areas of 
cooperation cover political, economic, social, cultural and linguistic areas, which it is 
stated have developed on the basis of shared values. 
 
The critical discourse approach would focus on elements that can form the general 
perceptions: standard political language such as joint determination, shared values, 
strategic dimension, constructive dialogue, a propitious climate. It would then look 
behind the words to understand what these standard formulations would really express, 
out of the belief that discourse aims at manipulating perceptions and influencing 
reflection and action. A social constructivist approach would focus on ideas associated 
with elements such as: democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the rule of law, good governance, pluralism, international peace and security. An LI 
approach would consider the economic aspects and geopolitical considerations of 
international peace and security, political stability and confidence among nations. Each 
of the three analytical approaches would to some extent fail to understand the aspects 
valued by the other theoretical approaches, although there are three variables that 
influence the evolution, and thereby only understand a part of the picture, not the whole 
picture. 
 
When looking at the point Integrating Africa into the World Economy, an LI approach 
would consider the economic aspects primarily from trade, sector development, and 
infrastructures; a social constructivist would take account of associated ideas such as 
social aspects of employment and poverty reduction; and a critical discourse analysis 
approach would focus on the meaning behind the integration of Africa. 
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When looking at Peace-building, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, a 
social constructivist approach would focus on the correlation between socio-economic 
development and peace, security, stability and justice. An LI approach would take into 
account the economic aspects of issues linked to disarmament, post-conflict assistance 
and terrorism link it to geopolitical considerations for European stability and security. A 
critical discourse analysis would focus on discourse itself and look for hidden agendas. 
 
When looking at the comparative analysis of the Summit strategies, the LI approach 
would interpret the promotion the peace and security element in detriment of poverty 
reduction goals based on probably geopolitical considerations in addition to associated 
economic interests, but it would fail to consider the underlying ideational aspect. This 
however, would be the focus of the social constructivist approach, which would link the 
policy initiatives to EU core values of democracy, democratic governance and peace 
and link the policy efforts to sustainable development. And so on. The aim of this 
exemplification is to buttress our argument, namely that any one of these meta-theories 
would fail to explain the full dimension of the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy, 
while a combined use of the meta-theories would contribute to obtain a more fully 
understanding of the motives for the evolution in the EU’s Africa policy. That is why 
we bring them all in play by using a hybrid approach of all three in analysing the 
underlying motives of the evolution. 
 
4.5. Summary 
The Cairo Summit was the first step in the process of establishing a more 
institutional framework between Africa and the EU with an enhanced political dialogue 
on issues of common interest and concern. The Cairo Summit Agenda that had been 
centered around five main themes (economic issues; the integrating of Africa into the 
world economy; Human Rights, democracy, governance and the rule of law; peace-
building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; and development issues;) was 
largely carried on in the Lisbon Summit Agenda, however, with a reshuffle in the listing 
of priorities in which peace and security issues gained strategic importance; carry-over 
issues gained increased importance such as climate change that was singled out from the 
development issues in the Cairo agenda and given a strategic partnership of its own in 
the Lisbon agenda; and new points such as energy were added, stressing concerns 
linked to energy security and access. The objective of the joint Africa-EU Strategy of 
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the Lisbon Summit aimed at strengthening the political dimension in the partnership 
between the two continents, through an enhanced, more inclusive political dialogue and 
an effective implantation of the strategy to continue to promote peace and security, as 
well as a system of effective multilateralism and strong and legitimate institutions. 
 
5. Towards a Joint Africa-EU Strategy: from Cairo to Lisbon 
The Cairo Summit set off a political dialogue framework between the EU and Africa 
that would gradually take the EU towards a more specific relationship to Africa, beyond 
the ACP. As the largest and potentially richest of the ACP regions, Africa is also the 
most close to Europe, historically as well as geographically. Europe had repeatedly 
stressed its special relationship with Africa since the late 1990’s and the Cairo agenda 
defined the priorities that would guide the development of the EU-Africa dialogue. 
 
“It translated into an increasing convergence of interests, despite differences 
between the EU and African states with regard to the primacy given to the identified 
priorities: Europeans by and large putting the accent particularly on peace and security 
issues, and Africans more on the trade and economic aspects of the partnership, 
including the need to address the debt problem” (ECDPM: 2006: 2). 
 
Traditionally the EU-African relationship had been fragmented in three cooperation 
frameworks: the Cotonou Partnership Agreement that defined the relationship between 
the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, all former colonies of 
its Member States; the former Barcelona process that created the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, now merged into the European Neighbourhood Policy defining Europe’s 
relations with its neighbours in the wider neighbourhood, among which North Africa; 
and the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with South Africa, now 
complemented by an EU-South Africa Strategy. Those three existing agreements had 
provided the framework around which the EU-Africa relations were organized and 
linked to the different agreements were separate financial instruments each answering to 
different EU policy logics towards the different regions (ECDPM: 2006: Issue Paper 1). 
 
The three frameworks for cooperation divided the EU-African cooperation 
geographically in Northern African countries, sub-Saharan African countries, and South 
Africa, and they still exist, in parallel to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Shifting 
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economic and political interests as a result of the end of the Cold War changed the EU-
Africa relations over time and led to a progressive strengthening of the political 
dimension in the various cooperation frameworks. 
 
5.1. Changes in Europe, Africa and the world 
Changes in Europe, Africa and the world all contributed to the founding of a new 
type of relationship between the EU and Africa. 
 
In Europe: on the on hand the enlargement process, increasing the number of Member 
states, and on the other, the deepening of the integration process, which had led to the 
development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), “in line with European ambitions for a greater 
political role on the international scene (ECDPM: 2006: 3). As Europe’s role in the 
world developed, it had adopted common policies on security, energy, climate change 
and innovation, and there was growing recognition of the importance of African 
economic prosperity for European prosperity and the need for more comprehensive and 
coherent policies towards Africa. 
 
In Africa: institutional and political changes with the transformation of the Organisation 
of the African Union (OAU) into the African Union (AU) and the launch of NEPAD, 
which on the one hand reinforced trends towards greater pan-African cooperation, and 
on the other provided the EU with a comparable institutional partner in Africa showing 
a commitment to common priorities including “an increasing commitment to tackle key 
socio-economic, political and security issues in Africa (ECDPM: 2006: 3). The AU 
produced results in the area of peace and security, e.g. AU-led peace support operations 
such as the AMIS mission in Darfur under the African Peace Facility (APF), promoted 
democratic governance e.g. through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and 
represented Africa in the international community. Economic, strategic, social and 
demographic factors also contributed to turning Africa into an emerging political actor 
in world politics. 
 
Africa’s increasing importance as a political actor in its own right achieved global 
recognition - and the consequences included the necessity of solidarity in assuring a 
fully inclusive and equitable globalization through policies and measures formulated 
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and implemented with the effective participation of the developing countries and 
economies in transition. 
 
In 2000, the Unites Nations Millenium Summit resulted in the establishment of the 
Millenium Development Goals (MDG).  In the UN Millenium Declaration, world 
leaders addressed the difficulties faced by developing countries and economies in 
transition in responding to the challenge of globalization and reaping its benefits. This 
declaration identified a series of objectives (such as peace, security and disarmament; 
development and poverty eradication; protection of the environment; human rights, 
democracy and good governance; meeting the special needs of Africa) in order to 
translate into action fundamental values the freedom to live in dignity, without hunger 
or the fear of violence; and equality of rights to the opportunity to benefit from 
development. The Declaration stated a series of measurable and time-bound targets, 
which grew into grew eight goals to be achieved by 2015, named the Millenium 
Development Goals (MDG) to combat extreme poverty, illiteracy, gender 
discrimination, child and maternal mortality, diseases, environmental degradation, and 
to create a global partnership for development.  Under the objective aiming at meeting 
the special needs of Africa, political leaders committed their support to bringing Africa 
into the world economy by consolidating democracy, working for lasting peace, 
eradicating poverty fostering sustainable development; specifically to build capacities to 
combat HIV/AIDS. 
 
In 2002, the G8 introduced the Africa Action Plan (AAP), which laid out commitments 
by G8 countries to assist development in Africa, following the NEPAD agenda. In 
2004, the British Prime Minister holding the UE Presidency launched an independent 
Commission for Africa, which established that “The developed world has a moral duty 
– as well as a powerful motive of self-interest – to assist Africa” (EPC: Issue Paper 38: 
2005: Annex I) and the importance of peace and security was stressed in supporting 
Africa’s development based on capacity building in governance; in 2005, the G8 
meeting in Gleneagles resulted in commitments to double aid to Africa, and measures of 
debt relief for the poorest countries all aimed at helping Africa meet the MDG following 
the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness resolved to scale up aid. In December 2005, 
the EU adopted “a first common, coherent and comprehensive EU Africa Strategy 
subtitled Towards a Strategic Partnership” (COM: 2007: 357: 4), which on the one hand 
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established a single EU framework, and on the other confirmed Africa’s development as 
an EU top political priority. 
 
Other factors which contributed to founding a new type of partnership between the EU 
and Africa are linked to the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, the Madrid bombings in 2003, 
and the London terror attacks in 2005, which all were factors in the scaling up of peace 
and security issues, as reflected in the EU’s 2005 Strategy for Africa. 
 
The 2005 EU Strategy for Africa reflected on the one hand, the EU priorities in its 
relations with Africa; at the same time it aimed at greater coherence among different 
policy areas, more coordination and complementarity, institutionally and between the 
Union and its Member States. “The Strategy aims to reinforce coordination and 
complementarity across the various EC’s Directorates General and between the EC and 
EU member states’ policies and strategies towards Africa. It also aims to ensure greater 
coherence among different European policy areas that have an impact on Africa (trade, 
aid, defence, peace and security, agriculture, migration), which is in itself a challenging 
process and a test to the European institutions and MS commonality of interests, 
capacity and political will” (ECDPM: 2006: 3). On the other hand, the Strategy 
provided guidelines for international cooperation, in line with EU commitments to an 
effective multilateralism policy: cooperation in the UN and G8 and with new actors 
such as China, who had established a China-Africa Strategy in 2000. 
 
5.2. Summary 
At the Cairo Summit in 2000, the EU took its first step to formulate a coherent 
policy towards Africa as a region; the 2003 EU-Africa dialogue strategic document 
stressed the political will in the EU to continue the institutionalization of this process 
despite the postponement of the planned second Summit in 2003; the adoption of an EU 
Strategy for Africa in 2005 set out the first EU political framework to improve the 
coordination, coherence and consistency of the Union’s policies and instruments aimed 
at a particular region. 
 
In addition to the development questions, conflict management emerged, stressing that 
the security problems in Africa were also a concern of Europe’s. The Cotonou 
Agreement’s Article 11 that dealt explicitly with peace-building policies, conflict 
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prevention and resolution and underlined the need for linking emergency measures, 
rehabilitation and development cooperation. The EU 2005 Africa Strategy furthermore 
stressed the importance of peace as a condition for lasting development a motive for the 
EU to step up its efforts to promote peace and security at all stages in the conflict cycle 
(Africa Strategy, 2005: 71). In the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the political and the 
security dimensions gained increasing importance. It can be concluded that from 2000 
to 2007 there was a steady upscaling of the security element in the EU Africa policy. 
 
6. The EU’s Africa’s policy: interests and ideas 
On motivational explanations for the evolution of the EU’s Africa policy, there is a 
shared opinion between policy analysts and academic scholars (Kotsopoulos: 2007; 
Faria: 2007; Olsen: 2007) that Africa offers the EU an arena in which it can test its 
ambitions as a significant global actor in developing a constructive regional power role 
while at the same time improve its capacity in external relations and coherence in 
foreign policy mainly through a combination of security and defence initiatives. This 
chapter will study the arguments for this thesis. 
 
6.1. External relations capacity and inter-institutional coherence 
Kotsopoulos2 argues that the EU’s policy towards Africa has “gradually evolved in 
line with developments in its overall approach to external relations (Kotsopoulos: 2007: 
3), and mainly through security and defence initiatives such as the ESS and the ESDP, a 
combination of which together with a comprehensive EU-Africa dialogue has brought 
coherence to the EU’s approach in Africa linking security to development in line with 
the 2005 UN World Summit, the MGD, the 2005 Paris Declaration and the G8 meetings 
in Gleneagles and Heiligendamm in 2007. According to Kotsopoulos, Africa offers an 
opportunity to the EU to develop its external relations capacity.  
 
Kotsopoulos links EU’s stronger commitment to Africa as a region to factors such as: a 
rising EU concern over energy security and Africa’s abundance of natural resources as 
an alternative to the more unstable Middle East; the growing Chinese presence in 
Africa, shrinking EU trade market shares and increasing Asian influence turning Asia 
into Africa’s third largest trading partner after the EU and the US; new global WTO 
                                                
2 John Kotsopoulos is a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC) 
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rules; and a shift in Western priorities with a greater focus on the security/development 
nexus in the light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Kotsopoulos also attributes shifting priorities in the EU-Africa relation to EU 
institutional changes with the appointment of an EU special representative to the AU; 
and internal changes in the Commission moving responsibility for ACP trade from the 
Directorate-General (DG) Development to DG Trade and ACP political relations from 
DG External Relations to DG Development. Furthermore Kotsopoulos identifies a 
growing European consensus on many aspects of development policy based on the 2005 
EU Strategy for Africa, which was approved by the Council, Commission and European 
Parliament:  
 
“Africa… offers to the EU an ideal “incubator” for developing inter-institutional 
coherence in foreign policy-making, especially given the physical, historical and 
cultural proximity between the two continents and the general consensus within the 
EU on how to deal with the region… an arena in which the EU can fulfil its 
commitments under the 2003 Joint EU-UN Declaration on Crisis Management, and 
start implementing its “battle groups” concept – especially as EU security initiatives 
do not clash with any NATO commitments or objectives” (Kotsopoulos: 2007: 4). 
 
6.2. Trying out integrated approaches 
Faria3 argues that Africa constitutes an “experimenting” ground for the EU to 
reaffirm its role as an international and security actor, in particular for developing the 
ESDP, and for testing integrated approaches such as linking security and development.  
 
The evolution in the European debate, giving political and security dimensions 
increased importance, and moving away from an almost exclusive focus on economic 
and social development is explained by Faria with the following trends: on the one 
hand, recognition of development policy “failure” and the need to address shortcomings 
linked to political and security constraints to development. On the other hand, 
recognition of a need for more coherence, coordination and complementarity in 
European policies following the specific new comprehensive, integrated approaches that 
                                                
3 Fernanda Faria is a Policy Analyst at Instituto Europeu de Estudos Internacionais (IEEI) 
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are being tried out in Africa, especially in the DRC. At the same time, EU ambitions to 
play a more significant role in the world, politically and in terms of security, to match 
its economic power and the deepening of the EU integration process; the CFSP/ESDP is 
“a response to those ambitions and there is recognition that “soft power” needs to be 
supported, if to be credible, by means and capacity to engage in security and defence 
activities” (Faria: 2007: 2). A stronger African peace and security agenda with the 
emergence of the AU and the creation of the African Peace Facility (APF) under the 
European Development Fund (EDF) and a generally accepted principle in the 
international community that it has responsibility to protect Human Rights, principle 
upheld in many EU Africa policies for areas such as crisis management, humanitarian 
aid, and the promotion of democracy, are other factors that Faria considers relevant. 
 
Faria challenges the ESS argument that links African countries/regions to key threats 
such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, argument used to step up EU security 
efforts, based on the assumption that it constitutes a threat for European security. She 
argues that African regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime do no so much 
have a direct impact on European security as they have a negative impact on EU 
commitments to sustainable development in Africa. 
 
Faria instead argues that European security concerns and interests in Africa are shaped 
by a mix of: “international values and commitments; national interests and historical 
ties of some MS; coherence and consistency with long-term European policies towards 
Africa; and EU institutional dynamics and integration process (e.g. the security-
development link within EU policies, consolidation of ESDP” (Faria: 2007: 4).  
 
Faria holds that EU energy interests in Africa and strong economic interests by some 
MS in Africa influence both the shaping of EU security concerns and the support to 
peace and stability agendas in Africa. Faria considers that a decisive factor for MS with 
fewer links to Africa, however committed to the EU integration process, is the idea that 
Africa conveys a test ground for EU trying out integrated approaches, including the 
development of the ESDP on a ground where EU activities are considered supportive / 
complementary to UN efforts rather than competing with organizations such as NATO. 
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Faria recalls that despite institutional constraints for EU joint action (such as lengthy 
procedures for decision making) EU operations in e.g. the DRC are examples of 
situations in which the EU can overcome this. She underlines the importance of 
elements such as UN legitimacy, political will and leadership linked to a common 
European agenda as contributing factors to the creation of MS consensus on EU joint 
actions. Faria defends that decisions to take action are often pushed by one or more MS 
who consider their interests are at stake; who are also willing to take leadership and 
have the financial and logistic capabilities to assume a large share of the mission cost. 
 
6.3. Influencing world politics 
Olsen4 argues that the drive to integrate the EU’s different policy instruments 
towards Africa can be explained by an ambition to influence world politics, and 
considers that the development of the CFSP and the ESDP is crucial for fulfilling this 
ambition. 
 
Olsen argues that the EU’s foreign policy as well as its internal cooperation is 
influenced by interests, identities and institutions: the interests change over time, but 
according to constructivist theories there is a trend of convergence in EU negotiations 
and decision making. Olsen sees the ambition to influence world politics as a material 
interest and an expression of an emerging European identity” (Olsen: 2007: 4), an 
identity associated with ideas and values such as democracy, peaceful conflict solutions 
through diplomatic mediation rather than coercive instruments, ethical and moral 
concerns; furthermore Olsen argues that institutions are key in forming interests and 
identities; particularly the European Commission and the Council of Ministers have a 
shared interest in establishing a more effective foreign and security policy: the 
Commission aims to increase the EU’s role in world affairs, and “the Council secretariat 
has a strong interest in developing the common foreign and defence policy as exactly 
these policy fields give more power to the secretariat” (Olsen: 2005: 5), and because 
involvement in conflict management and prevention requires the use of all the EU’s 
external policy instruments, it also requires the involvement of both the Commission 
and the Council. 
 
                                                
4 Gorm Rye Olsen is Institut Leader at the Department of Society and Globalisation, University of 
Roskilde, Denmark 
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6.4. Synthesis 
The three analysts seem to generally agree upon the thesis that Africa provides the 
EU with both a physical space and relevant test ground material for trying out new 
integrated approaches in external relations including actions within the framework of 
CFSP/ESDP, and for developing inter-institutional coherence in foreign-policy making. 
There seems to be a general consensus on the main interests and ideas behind the EU’s 
Africa policy initiatives, however before turning to an in-depth discussion of these, the 
following two chapters will continue to line up evidence of the evolutionary path. 
 
Chapter seven is related to Africa in the EU security debate and refer to the 2005 
“European Consensus of Development”, to ideas of consistency, coherence, and 
complementarity, and to the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa region for 
testing the EU-Africa Policy. Chapter eight is related to concrete initiatives launched in 
recent years in Africa within the CFSP/ESDP framework. 
 
7. Africa in the EU security debate: interests, ideas and discourse 
This chapter will analyze the EU’s Africa Strategy from 2000 to 2007 to identify 
point of coherence, coexistence of interests, ideas and discourse that relate to the 
argument that Africa is in fact a test ground for European CFSP and ESDP polities on 
the road to increasing globalization in which the EU plays a leading role. The chapter 
will study documents related to the EU’s Africa Policy and identify the existence of a 
dominant discourse as well as evolutionary trends associating the concepts of security to 
development through conflict prevention and peace building by studying initiatives 
launched within the CFSP/ESDP framework in recent years in Africa to establish a link 
between interests, ideas and discourse in the EU’s Africa policy. 
 
7.1. Consensus building by prevention and settlement of conflicts 
In May 2001 the EU adopted a common position on conflict prevention in Africa. 
The position “… underscored the EU’s resolve to enhance its political partnership with 
the AU and to move its various instruments more towards the area of conflict 
prevention and peace building” (COM 2003: 0316: 6), and the area of prevention and 
settlement of conflicts was considered an area of “consensus building” between 
Europeans and Africans. In October 2001, a follow-up to Cairo by the First Bi-Regional 
Group of Senior Officials decided upon a “reshuffle” of priorities and moved up to a 
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first place in the list of priorities the area of human rights, democracy and good 
governance, followed by the areas of prevention and settlement of conflicts, and of food 
security, while the area of trade moved down from a first to a sixth position; a Joint 
Declaration on terrorism was adopted and the following year a further declaration was 
adopted on terrorism dealing with issues of peace and security (COM 2003: 0316). 
 
7.2. Complementarity, consistency and coherence 
In 2003, the EU Commission’s communication to the Council entitled “The EU-
Africa dialogue” (COM: 2003: 0316) linked the areas of peace and development, 
suggesting consideration on how to pool EU aid in support of an EU-Africa agenda, 
declaring: “If such pooling can be achieved, one of the first applications could be to 
help establish a continent-wide facility for peace support operations that could help 
stabilise those areas in Africa that are hindered in their development be recent or long-
standing conflicts” (COM 2003: 0316: 4). The document called for complementarity 
with other existing structures such as the Cotonou Agreement, the EU-Med Partnership 
Agreement and the EU-South Africa Trade Development Cooperation Agreement. 
 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement includes the development cooperation, political 
and trade dimensions between the EU and the African, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) 
countries5 and in Africa covers all the sub-Saharan countries. The Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement was preceded by first the Yaoundé and then the Lomé Conventions (I-IV). 
In June 2000, the Lomé Conventions were substituted by the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement, which is valid until 2020 and aims to lessen and over time eliminate 
poverty as well as promote sustainable development and integration of the ACP-
countries in the world economy. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement contained three key innovations: 1) trade liberalization (linked 
to the WTO rules and norms); 2) political conditionality (failure to meet political 
conditions linked to good governance, respect for Human Rights, democratic principles 
and the rule of law, could trigger possible sanctions leading to suspension of the 
agreement); and 3) regional and economic differentiation (based on the level of 
                                                
5 “The EU’s dealings with the ACP states were originally based on a provision of the Rome Treaty 
allowing non-European countries and territories that had a “special relationship” with member states to 
become associated with the EC. “Special relationship was a euphemism for being a current of former 
colony” (Dinan: 2005: 548-549) 
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development and ability to withstand global competition, the agreement differentiated 
among countries and regions and called for negotiation of regional economic 
partnership agreements by 2008 (Dinan: 2005: 553). Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA) negotiations were a major issue at the Lisbon Summit. 
 
Although South Africa is a member of the Cotonou Agreement, EU-South Africa trade 
relations are governed by a trade, development and cooperation agreement that entered 
into force in January 2000. Because of South Africa’s size and special status (a 
developing, or a developed country, depending on the sector under consideration), the 
Lomé countries feared the competition of the South African economy; the EU, however, 
feared a WTO challenge from non-Lomé trading partners and accordingly included the 
country under a special protocol of Lomé but excluded it from a special trade regime 
(Dinan: 2005: 554). The Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with South 
Africa together with an EU-South Africa Strategy, defines the EU’s relations with South 
Africa in the areas of trade relations, political dialogue and cooperation. 
 
The particularity of the ENP defines the EU’s relationship with its neighbouring 
countries, among which Northern African Countries. “The EU-Africa dialogue” 
document reviewed the focus of the dialogue set off in Cairo three years earlier: since 
Cairo, the concept of “Wider Europe” had been gaining significance and a 
communication of a new framework for relations with Eastern and Southern neighbours 
(later known as the European Neighbourhood Policy) had been issued; Africa had 
deepened its own integration with the creation of the AU and NEPAD, and the EU and 
Africa could now “… base their partnership on shared objectives and common values 
that can be found in the Treaty of The European Union, the Cotonou Agreement and the 
Barcelona process, as well as in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and in the 
NEPAD manifesto” (COM2003: 0316: 2). EU policy consistency and coherence was 
stressed, referring that the EU-Africa dialogue should help strengthen EU-Africa 
political, economic and socio-cultural relations “… in line with EU external policy” 
(idem) and further ahead it was underlined that “essential elements” of the EU external 
policy, such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law, were also central values of 
the AU and NEPAD. 
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The EU Strategy for Africa adopted at the European Council Meeting in December 
2005 in the document “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to 
accelerate Africa’s development” (COM2005: 489) maintained the security discourse 
stating peace as a precondition for lasting development. The development and security 
discourse was further supported by a financial commitment to strengthening the African 
Peace Facility “with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding”, as well as 
“direct support… to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and 
military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU 
battle groups…” (BRU: 2005: 15961/05: Presse 367: 4). As a prerequisite for attaining 
the MDG it was instilled that: “The EU should step up its efforts to promote peace and 
security at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, via conflict 
management to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction”, and there was a 
commitment to further support the Peace Facility for Africa. The common security 
challenge was presented with a reference to 9/11: “Security has become a top priority 
worldwide since 11 September 2001… The security of citizens is now a major priority 
for both Africa and Europe” (ibid: 4).  
 
In 2007, on the evolution of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership from Cairo to Lisbon, 
the EC argued that the EU Strategy for Africa had been useful for mobilising a more 
coherent EU support for Africa-led development efforts both as a policy framework and 
as a political process; it had allowed stronger internal EU policy coherence and better 
coordination of Commission and Member States' policies towards Africa; and it had 
made the EU a better, more united and more effective partner (COM: 2007: 357). 
 
7.3. Coordination of instruments: aid, trade and development 
The EU’s 2005 Africa Strategy had recommended that the EU should increase as 
well as improve its aid effectiveness: turning aid more effective would “enhance the 
EU’s collective political leverage” (COM 2005: 489:6) and in the light of the EU 
decision to double aid flows to Africa between 2004 and 2010, the importance of 
showing results was underlined: “Overall, it will be important to demonstrate that the 
substantial increases in aid flows have served their purpose in helping recipient 
countries in their attainments of the MDGs” (ibid.). Because African development was 
at the top of the international political agenda, enjoying broad international consensus 
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on the basic action required, Europe should take a leading role in the process of “getting 
Africa back on the track of sustainable development and of meeting the MDGs by the 
target year of 2015. That is …our common duty” (COM 2005: 489: 7). This was in line 
with the 2005 “European Consensus on Development, claiming that combating global 
poverty was not only a moral obligation, but also a responsibility of the developed 
countries; and in line with the 2005 Blair Commission of Africa report that stressed the 
importance of peace and security in supporting Africa’s development based on 
governance capacity building, established that the developed world had a “moral duty – 
as well as a powerful motive of self-interest – to assist Africa” (EPC: Issue Paper 38: 
2005: Annex I). 
 
In 2006, the European Commission, DG Development, gave three reasons for the 
creation of the EU Strategy for Africa. The reasons linked development, aid 
effectiveness and conflict prevention. While the first reason was linked to the 2005 UN 
review on the MDG, indicating that Africa would only reach most targets by 2050: 
Europe had a special responsibility as Africa’s biggest aid donor and trading partner, the 
second was linked to the 2005 European Consensus on development policy, which 
engaged the EU as a whole regarding EU development policy, and defined its 
implementation on Community level, including in the area of conflict prevention. The 
third reason was linked to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2005 midterm review. 
 
While the 2007 Commission paper “From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic 
Partnership” (COM: 2007: 357) maintained the security discourse in presenting the new 
Development Assistance Policy, it underlined the importance of EU’s presence in 
Africa in terms of trade, investment and official development assistance (ODA). In 
recognition of the presence of new actors on the African scene, such as China, it 
stressed the need for a new approach in the relations between the Europe and Africa, “if 
the EU wants to remain a privileged partner and make the most of its relations with 
Africa” (ibid: 3). It recognized the importance of the EU’s Africa Strategy of 2005 but 
now sought consistent policy coherence with other instruments such as trade and 
research going beyond development cooperation, towards a full inclusion of “all 
political matters of common concern and common interest” (ibid):  
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In the light of an enlarged EU now including 27 Member States and having an enhanced 
role in the world with ambitious common policies on security, energy, climate change 
and innovation, and in the light of general recognition that African economic prosperity 
was essential for European prosperity, there was a need for a more comprehensive 
partnership and more coherent policies towards Africa. Although the EU, in terms of 
trade, remained the first economic partner of Africa, with exportation of merchandise 
amounting to € 91.6 billion and importation reaching € 125.6 billion in 2005), 
investment and official development assistance (ODA), it was no longer Africa’s only 
source of finance, aid and trade: China was now Africa's third most important trade 
partner with total trade is up from € 30 billion in 2005 to € 43 billion in 2006, and 23% 
of all Chinese oil imports coming from Africa.  
 
The Communication stressed the need for institutional, political and cultural changes to 
its relationship with Africa, in order to remain a privileged partner and make the most of 
its relations with Africa: while based on the EU's 2005 Africa Strategy in 2005, the EU 
wanted to move on from a strategy for Africa towards a political partnership with 
Africa: the aim of the 2005 Strategy had been to establish a single framework for all EU 
players and confirm Africa's development as one of the EU's top political priorities; 
now the EU-Africa dialogue should go beyond discussing "African" matters and include 
global themes, with strengthening of EU-Africa cooperation at the political level. 
 
In December 2007, the EU Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union signed a “European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid”, the first 
comprehensive joint EU policy statement on humanitarian aid, aiming at better EU 
coordination and good donor practice. 
 
7.4. The Horn of Africa 
The 2006 EC proposal for a partnership with the Horn of Africa stressed the 
complementarity between security and development and linked instability in the region 
to threats to EU security. As part of the EU strategy for Africa, the EU regional political 
partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa (COM: 2006: 
601) built on both the 2005 “European Consensus for Development” Strategy and the 
2005 “EU-Africa Strategy”. 
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As one of the most conflict-prone regions and one of the poorest in the world, the Horn 
region was considered relevant for testing the EU-Africa Strategy. “On the basis of this 
policy framework, the European Commission is now proposing to set up a “Regional 
Political Partnership” with the Horn of Africa6, as a test case for applying the EU-Africa 
Strategy” (COM: 2006: 601: 4). It linked instability, the MDG and conflict prevention 
and could guide EU external action in the region.  
 
The strategic importance of the region was explained in light of the security nexus, in 
terms of economic interests including trade and energy supply, and in terms of 
geostrategic interests stressing that the U.S., China and India all had taken strategic 
interest in the region and were investing significant resources there. The implications 
for EU security were explained: “… an uncontrolled, politically neglected, 
economically marginalised and environmentally damaged Horn has the potential to 
undermine the region’s and the EU’s broad stability and development policy objectives 
and to pose a threat to European security” (COM: 2006: 601: 5), through factors such as 
illegal migration, refugee flows, terrorism and religious extremism. 
 
The strong economic interests in terms of trade and particularly energy supplies were 
linked to the region’s strategically important close vicinity to the Middle East, Saudi 
Arabia and to North African and Near East countries covered by the EU Neighbourhood 
Policy. 
 
Overall the region provided test ground material in attempts to articulate regional cross-
cutting issues and address connections between insecurity, poverty and governance by 
focusing on three main cooperation areas: peace, security and governance; food 
security; and institutional development. EU regional action is proposed to strengthen the 
mainstreaming of “human security” approaches into development programmes, and to 
“dovetail all EU strategies, policies and programmes geared towards countries of the 
Horn of Africa” (COM: 2006: 601: 11). 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Defined as including all IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) countries: Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda 
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7.5. Initiatives launched in Africa within the framework of CFSP/ESDP 
On an operational level, in the period from Cairo to Lisbon, the EU increased 
funding for AU-led peace support operations (such as the AMIS mission in Darfur) 
under the African Peace Facility (COM: 2007: 357) and several initiatives were 
launched in Africa. Olsen (2007: 8-12) singles out the following three initiatives: 
 
7.5.1. Operation “Artemis” 
On 12 June 2003, the EU Council of Ministers adopted a resolution which for 
the first time deployed military forces in Africa (in the DRC). Operation Artemis was 
the EU’s first crisis management operation outside Europe implemented without using 
NATO facilities, and it aimed at stabilizing the security situation in a crisis-ridden 
province and improving the humanitarian situation in a main town. (Olsen: 2007:8). 
 
The launch of the Artemis operation has been interpreted as largely motivated by the 
interests of two great EU powers, Britain as France, which shared an interest in securing 
a role for the EU in world politics through the continued development of the ESDP. 
Through a military intervention outside Europe, however in a low-sensitive area 
compared to the Middle East, France could obtain political recognition as an “effective 
military actor” (Olsen: 2007: 9) and Britain would be able to prove a continued interest 
in developing a European defence. Another interpretation is linked to the 2003 Iraq war, 
which had created deep cleavages among the European MS: the launch of the Artemis 
operation would affirm a continued ability to political cooperation among the MS and 
willingness to continue the development of the ESDP. 
 
7.5.2. The African Peace Facility (APF) 
On 17 November 2003, it was approved by the General Affairs Council 
approved to use money from the European Development Fund (EDF) to create the 
African Peace Facility, an AU initiative with the aim to support peacekeeping 
operations. Olsen refers that the legal basis of the APF was considered its biggest 
innovation in that until then European Treaties had always considered peacekeeping or 
conflict resolution as falling under the intergovernmental pillar and not in under 
development in the community pillar. By 2006, the APF had provided over 242 Million 
Euros in support of the AU’s AMIS mission in Darfur (Olsen: 2007: 8). 
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Interests behind the EU support to the APF are attributed on the one side to “…a strong 
EU desire to have the African Union take responsibility for the security in Africa. 
Allegedly, it was the aim to avoid direct EU military involvement in Darfur” (Olsen: 
2007: 10); on the other side, it is interpreted as “… instrumental in buttressing the 
ambition of the Union to become a global actor” (ibid.). 
 
7.5.3. The EUPOL-Kinshasa Mission 
The EUPOL-Kinshasa Mission in the DRC was the EU’s first civilian crisis 
management operation in Africa. It was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 
December 2004 and fell within the ESDP-framework. An advisory mission for security 
reform in the DRC followed within six months (in June 2005) to ensure the 
compatibility with Human Rights, democratic principles and good governance in the 
promotion of policies. In 2006, the EUPOL DRC followed: a military operation decided 
by the Foreign Affairs Council and also conducted within the ESDP-framework with 
the objective to support the UN mission (MONUC) in stabilising the situation during 
elections and protecting civilians and Kinshasa’s airport. The EU’s military contribution 
included the availability of aprox. 2000 troops deployable from neighbouring Gabon 
and 1000 soldiers in the area of Kinshasa (Olsen: 2007: 10-11). 
 
Olsen argues that the EU interventions in the DRC can be interpreted on the background 
of the ambition to become a significant global actor; they can also be interpreted as 
contributing to the EU’s Africa Strategy’s aim to create consistence and coherence in its 
Africa policy; and an SDA (Security and Defence) discussion paper concludes that “The 
Congolese crisis has functioned as a political testing ground for the EU to design forms 
of intervention” (Olsen: 2007: 11). 
 
7.6. Summary 
This second part of the thesis has lined up the evolution of the EU’s Africa Policy 
from Cairo to Lisbon; based on a comparative analysis of the Summit agendas, it has 
identified a general trend towards an increasing prioritizing of the field of peace and 
security; it has presented theses on possible underlying ideas and interests that may 
explain this evolution; and it has scrutinized political discourse and action related to the 
Africa Strategy to establish: first, if any dominating EU political arguments or discourse 
have influenced the development of the Joint Africa Strategy; second, if primarily 
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interests or ideas have dominated and influenced its evolution; and third, the importance 
that the Joint Africa Strategy may have for the EU’s position as a significant actor on 
the international scene. Part three will analyze the various factors presented, discuss the 
ideas, and link the discussion to my thesis that the EU’s Africa Strategy must be seen in 
a wider perspective of a global strategy to shape world politics. 
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PART THREE 
The EU and Africa in a global world 
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8. Introduction 
The European Community, later the EU, has conducted its external relations in an 
increasingly comprehensive way on the foreign political scene over the years: since the 
1950s, it has developed relations with the outside world through a common policy on 
trade and development assistance and through trade and cooperation agreements; since 
the 1970s, it has provided humanitarian aid around the world; since 1993, with the 
Maastricht Treaty, it has been developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)  taking on an effective 
role since the European Councils in Helsinki in 1999 and in Nice in 2000, undertaking 
conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping operations around the world; 
in 1999, it appointed an EU High Representative for the CFSP; in 2003, it adopted a 
European Security Strategy an the EU Neighbourhood Policy, effective from 2004, 
where the Constitutional Treaty (in 2007, merged into the Lisbon Treaty, yet to be 
ratified) foresaw the creation of an EU foreign minister coordinating a common EU 
diplomatic service. The EU’s external relations have over the last decades developed 
both in substance and in form creating a complex system comprising aid, trade and 
security: all issues with European dimensions that impose some form of limits to 
Member State autonomy (SIEPS: 2008:4). 
 
The argument of this thesis is that to understand the evolution of the EU’s Africa Policy 
it must be seen in a wider strategic context by which the EU seeks to manage 
globalization to its advantage, address perceived threats to EU security and stability, 
and strengthen the international order based on the rule of law and multilateral 
institutions. There is an underlying understanding of security as a wider concept 
including political, economic, social and environmental as well as military aspects and 
geographically widened (enlarged) to include both sub-national and global levels based 
on the rationale that instability in the world can jeopardize EU stability. The EU 
perceives itself as an engine for reforms and having created an inner market on 
continental scale by setting transnational norms and rules, it now seeks to spread these 
to regulate global interactions. To promote EU interests, i.e. EU security and prosperity, 
it wants to shape the multilateral global agenda. In this part, we will discuss the role of 
the EU’s Africa policy in the light of increasing globalization. 
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9. Interests, ideas and discourse related to the EU’s Africa Policy 
While the EC discourse related to the EU’s Africa policy over the years maintains a 
strong note on the importance of helping Africa meet the MDG and of the special 
responsibility of Europe, as Africa’s biggest aid donor and trading partner there is 
increased insistence on the interconnectedness between development, aid effectiveness 
and conflict prevention; the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership cannot be said to hold 
many hidden agendas with respect to areas of EU self interest: there is a clear statement 
of the importance of African economic prosperity for European prosperity, and of the 
presence of new actors, such as China, on the African market, which represents a new 
source of finance, aid and is taking increasing market shares. It is stated clearly that a 
more elaborate partnership and a strengthened institutional, political relationship with 
Africa is needed, if Europe wants to remain a privileged partner and make the most of 
its relations with Africa. China is now Africa's third most important trade partner and 
23% of all Chinese oil imports come from Africa (COM: 2007: 357). 
 
Where the Cairo Agenda had prioritized economic issues and the integration of Africa 
into the world economy, the 2007 emphasis was clearly on strengthening EU-Africa 
political cooperation and including global themes ranging from energy and climate 
change over trade and food security to terrorism, peace and security. Other common 
concerns in Europe are related to the spill-over effects of crises in its broad 
neighbourhood, and the Horn of Africa Strategy clearly exemplifies the strategic 
importance given to Africa both as a test element to mainstreaming “human security” 
approaches into development programmes, and coordinating all EU strategies, policies 
and programmes geared towards the region (COM: 2006: 601: 11), to test the EU-
Africa policy, but also to protect EU interests in the areas of energy supply and broad 
security considering possible spill-over effects from regional instability in terms of 
illegal migration, refugee flows, and terrorism. 
 
The thesis argues that other parallel EU strategies have influenced the evolution of the 
Africa Policy, and singles out three: the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2005 
European Consensus for Development, and an EC 2006 strategic document on “Europe 
in the World – some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and 
Visibility”. The argument is based on a new power balance taking place in the world 
since the end of the Cold War. 
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9.1. The EU and the security complex 
With the end of the Cold War an international order collapsed. Nearly twenty years 
later a new distribution of power within the global system is not yet in place, but certain 
tendencies are unfolding. On the one hand, a relative weakening of the old superpowers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union is taking place, and on the other, an “increasing 
power and cohesion of the European Community as a political actor on the world stage” 
(Buzan, Barry…  [et al.], 1990:1). 
 
The Maastricht Treaty had established two new policy instruments: the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), and they gave the Union a possibility to play a more proactive role on the 
international scene. Although the EU is traditionally associated with ideas of “soft 
power”7 in the resolution of conflicts, as opposed to “hard” (military) power, some EU 
Member States such as France and the UK ambition a more “hard power” approach, to 
reinforce European autonomy, and the ESDP opens a window of opportunity to play out 
this ambition (Olsen: 2007: 1-11). 
 
In 2003, the EU launched the “European Security Strategy”. The discourse of the ESS 
(2003) stresses that “security is a precondition of development” (ESS: 2003: 2). The 
underlying rationale is that political problems and violent conflict are linked to 
economic failure of developing regions, often due to bad governance, and prone to 
originate key threats such as organised crime, terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (ranging from biological weapons to missile technology), failure of 
states, corruption, drugs dealing and trafficking, that all have an undermining effect on 
social order and the rule of law, and potentially threat European security and values. 
 
The ESS further underlined the fact that Europe’s traditional threat-of-invasion-concept 
of self-defence was changed with the end of the Cold War: now the “first line of 
defence will often be abroad”, and because new threats were no longer purely military 
                                                
7 “Definition: Soft power comprizes trade and aid, cultural links and institutionalized “political dialogue” 
through a web of sometimes overlapping organizations (such as the OSCE and possible NATO) that, at 
least within Europe itself, constitutes what some call a security community – an area characterizes by 
such a high level of transaction and communication that conflicts are always resolved peacefully” (Bale: 
2006: 251). 
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they required “a mixture of instruments” (ESS: 2003: 7). In the light of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, Europe further stepped up its security concerns and established three strategic 
objectives: first by addressing the threats through measures, policies, and interventions 
(including in the Democratic Republic of Congo); second by building security in 
Europe’s “neighbourhood” (including North Africa and The Middle East) based on the 
idea that promoting peace and stability through economic and political cooperation with 
neighbouring countries and regions will serve Europe’s interests; third by establishing: 
an international (rule-based) order based on effective multilateralism through regional 
organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe (including the African 
Union); trade and development policies; “assistance programmes, conditionality and 
targeted trade measures” (ESS: 2000: 10) all contribute to better governance, and the 
underlying idea is that a just world offering equal opportunities for all will enhance EU 
security. 
 
The policy implications for Europe required a more coordinated, coherent and active 
use of instruments such as European assistance programmes and the EDF, as well as 
Member States military and civilian capabilities assuming that a pooled and shared use 
of assets would reduce costs and increase capabilities and enhance the EU’s global 
impact and allow it to “… be a formidable force for good in the world” (ESS: 2003: 13). 
 
This thesis considers that the arguments contained in the ESS have relevance for the 
evolution of the EU’s Africa policy: for the increasing importance laid on the security 
nexus in the development debate; and for the necessity to develop a military, strategic 
capacity for action in order to enhance global impact of the EU. And here Africa could 
also provide an adequate test ground, while building on already existing instruments and 
structures and acting in a continent where there was a historical engagement for 
different reasons as we have seen. However, the factual security risk of African 
instability for EU stability, as argued by Faria (in 6.2.) is questionable. From a critical 
discourse analysis point of view the ESS would help explain the insistence on the area 
of peace and security and link it to the rise in EU military actions in Africa. 
 
The more multi-polar and fluid power structure that emerged after the end of the Cold 
War relit an old discussion of the military and non-military dimensions of European 
security and because the conception of state security is linked to their ability to maintain 
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their identity (Buzan, Barry…  [et al.], 1990:3), national security gained increasing 
importance in the sectors affecting the security of human collectives; it was linked to 
political, economic, societal, environmental and of military security and thus to the 
military factor in a broader context of contemporary European security. 
 
The evolution of European integration assents of peaceful solution of conflict, 
mediation and consensus building through institutional interaction, but Europe in a 
globalized world had to rethink its strategic positioning and alliances. This argument is 
based on the idea of Europe seen as a “security complex, a group of states whose 
securities are sufficiently interdependent to make them a type of sub-system within the 
overall pattern of international security” (Buzan, Barry…  [et al.], 1990:14); and closely 
linked to the idea of distribution of power through the link of security complexes 
through the mechanism of penetration, such as occurs in e.g. a situation of colonization. 
 
On the one hand, Europe has reached a state of maturity and integration that turns it into 
a new power in the world system, by “size and scope” (Dinan: 2005: 519), and political 
structure; on the other hand, Africa is linked to Europe, both through a “overlay” 
process (Buzan, Barry…  [et al.], 1990:16) from the time of colonization, but also 
through the process of aid, one of the cornerstones of European integration, and one 
linked with values of moral, ethics, and responsibility. Another argument is that there is 
nothing to forge a sense of unity as a perceived outer threat. The 2003 war in Iraq is 
associated with an increased concern in Europe over the issue of security and defence 
and the need for consensus on NATO-commitment. 
 
Bale holds that “Europe” in the world can be viewed as a mix and interaction of MS 
foreign policies, and EU external relations in aid, trade and development, including 
environmental concerns, CFSP and ESDP; interaction to which is associated an 
increasing degree of consensus. Although EU foreign policy cooperation is 
institutionalized, domestic influences on foreign policy still weigh and MS guard the 
right to protect own interests. However, there is a tendency to MS weighing the 
consequences of following their own interests, often tending to put them aside if they 
appear to differ from the majority, in consideration of maintaining a collective security 
and prosperity. “The EU, probably more even than organizations such as the OSCE, 
contributes to a European security community” (Bale: 2006: 269). 
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This thesis argues that the Africa policy is part of a global EU strategy through which 
the EU aims to project itself in the world with the power to actively influence world 
politics through a more integrated approach by mainstreaming and coordinating external 
policies and instruments including strategies leading to a greater visibility in the world. 
Two other parallel strategies buttress this argument: one is the European Consensus for 
Development, the other a strategy for EU in the world - for greater coherence, 
effectiveness and visibility. 
 
9.2. The European Consensus for Development 
The European Consensus for Development aims to streamline the implementation of 
the European Commissions and the EU Member State policies, particularly in three 
areas: poverty reduction with a special focus on the MDG to ensure a sustainable and 
equitable globalisation; development based on EU democratic values (respect for 
Human Rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, good 
governance, gender equality, solidarity, social justice and effective multilateralism, 
singling out the UN framework; and aid alignment with developing countries’ national 
strategies and procedures based on the concept of ownership by which the developing 
countries are principal responsible for their own development . The Consensus aims at 
turning EU aid more effective, through better coordination and a coordinated position 
between EU and MS in the UN and in international financial institutions, by speaking 
with “one” voice. 
 
The EU accounts for more than half of all development aid worldwide and is increasing 
its Official Development Assistance (ODA) by 2010, of which half of the additional aid 
will be destined for Africa, in particular to fragile states and countries registering a low 
number of donors. The EU aims increasingly at policy coherence for development, i.e. 
to build synergies between policies other than development cooperation having a strong 
impact on developing countries, arguably to accelerate progress towards the MDG. The 
2005 Policy Coherence for Development aimed at applying policy coherence in twelve 
policy areas, among which trade, environment and climate change, security, agriculture, 
bilateral fishing agreements, social policies, migration, transport and energy. However, 
these areas are closely linked to EU reforms, such as in the areas of trade or of 
agriculture with the sugar reforms for example. The ongoing Doha round, and the EPA 
negotiations is another example of the importance of trade in the multilateral system. 
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The following is based on information about the Doha negotiations from the WTO site. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) regulates international trade policy on a 
multilateral basis, alternatively to being conducted bilaterally and regionally. The WTO 
is the primary focus of EU’s trade policy and provides an international legal system that 
ensures the consideration and involvement of developing countries. Existing since 
January 1995, the WTO succeeded the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade), and is an international organisation designed to supervise and liberalize 
international trade. The WTO deals with the rules of trade between nations, is 
responsible for negotiating and implementing new trade agreements and policies, and 
supervising member countries’ adherence to the agreements. The WTO conducts 
negotiations through so-called rounds. The Doha Development Round started in 
November 2001 and is still ongoing. It aims at integrating developing countries in the 
global economy, lowering trade barriers and permitting free trade between countries of 
varying prosperity.  
 
The WTO negotiations aim at lower barriers to trade in areas such as agricultural 
products, commodities, environment, competition and differential treatment of 
developing economies, based on the belief that positive results from the round will 
boost economic growth and welfare in the global economy. WTO estimated the removal 
of all commodity trade barriers would result in a USD 620 billions gain, 40% of which 
would benefit developing countries.  
 
Ministerial meetings are conducted every two years, and since the launch of the Round, 
have taken place in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, and in Hong Kong, China, in 2005. 
Related negotiations have taken place in Geneva and Paris and as of 2008, cleavages 
between the developed countries, led by the EU, the US and Japan, and the major 
developing countries, led by mainly India, Brazil, China and South Africa, led to stalls 
of the negotiations.  
 
Just before Cancun, the EU and the US presented a common paper on agriculture 
containing important concessions. The EU was willing to remove export subsidies on 
products of particular interest to developing countries, but WTO members could not 
agree on farm subsidies and access to markets. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and the U.S. government agro-subsidies were seen as price distorting. The 
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Cancun meeting ended without results, and developing countries were seen as having 
the confidence to reject what they perceived as an unfavourable deal. A new trade bloc 
of developing and industrialized nations, the G20, led by Brazil, India, China and South 
Africa, the G4, claims to negotiate on behalf of all the developing nations, however, 
many of the poorest continue to have little influence over WTO proposals. The 2005 
Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting resulted in a deadline for the elimination of subsidies 
for agricultural export by 2013, and the requirement of industrialized countries to open 
their markets to goods from the poorest nations. The main dividing issues in subsequent 
talks both in Geneva in 2006, and in Potsdam in 2007, had to do with reducing rich 
nation farm subsidies, lowering of import taxes, and opening up agricultural and 
industrial markets. 
 
The EPA negotiations were a major point of discordance between the parties during the 
Lisbon Summit. The President of Senegal left the Summit in protest over the EPA 
negotiations. From the African side it was argued that the EPA would give more EU 
access to African markets and turn fragile African economies even more fragile. The 
problem for some African countries lies in the loss of considerable amounts of trade 
tolls, but the European Commission argues that the EPA represent an opening of the EU 
markets for African products. The EU is the biggest export market for African products, 
importing close to 85% of African exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables. The parties 
failed to reach agreement on the EPA negotiations during the Lisbon Summit that were 
not mentioned in the final comments on the Summit. This part on the trade negotiations 
is included in the discussion of the EU interests in Africa, because despite EU insistence 
on not seeing Africa as simply a “market”, strong trade links connect the parties. 
 
9.3. Greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility 
The 2006 EC strategic document aiming at greater coherence, effectiveness and 
visibility for Europe in the world is linked to the problematic of competitiveness in a 
global market place. Europe is a mature economy, strong but facing aging population 
and slow growth rates. New challenges in the form of emerging Asian economies 
increase the competition over market shares, and access to energy and raw materials in 
the world. And the EU is highly dependant upon external energy and raw material 
supply. While on the one hand, the EU’s internal policies have an increasing influence 
on international relationships and on its external influence, on the other hand they are 
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dependant upon an effective use of external policies. Its external policy instruments are 
developed to both protect and to promote its interests and values: internal and external 
policies are inextricably linked. The Lisbon Agenda aimed at increasing EU 
competitiveness in a global marketplace and EU competition policy aims at protecting 
its inner market. The inner market is built upon a common customs regime and a 
common trade policy. Its survival in a global marketplace depends upon global 
recognition of its system and that is why the external projection of EU internal policies 
are considered in its external foreign policy objectives through its mix of strategic 
relations, political dialogue with strategic partners, the CFSP and the ESDP, 
development, trade and competitiveness, the ENP and its successive enlargements. 
 
9.4. The EU-AU Energy Partnership 
Peace and security will also be linked to energy. Dependence on imported energy 
resources and the perspective of future military conflicts in this field call for a paragraph 
on this theme. (This paragraph is based on an article from EurActiv from 09/09/2008.) 
 
In March 2007, EU Heads of State and Governments agreed on a two-year plan to 
launch a common EU energy policy to increase European resilience to oil-shocks, 
mitigate EU dependency on a few external suppliers, and respond to the challenge of 
global warning. Among planned actions was the development of a common external 
energy policy with major supplier, consumer and transit countries, including Russia. 
 
On 08 September 2008, an EU-AU energy partnership was launched to help diversify 
Europe’s energy supplies. The partnership is linked to the 2006 failure to reach a 
partnership agreement with Russia on energy supply, and to projects for increased 
energy infrastructures in Africa that could help diversify EU energy supply. 
 
The EU imports almost 15% of its oil and gas from Africa and Algeria is currently the 
third largest exporter of gas to the EU behind Russia and Norway. The EU is investing 
in infrastructure, such as off-shore pipelines to Spain and Italy, and considering plans 
related to solar power installations in the Sahara desert to feed Europe’s growing energy 
demand via a new supergrid. Nigeria is another possible strategic partner in EU’s 
energy supply diversification efforts with large quantities of gas and oil reserves. 
European oil companies are investing in infrastructures and a Trans-Saharan Gas 
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Pipeline project would be able to transport Nigerian natural gas across the desert to EU 
markets via Algeria. 
 
In January 2007, the European Commission had presented a strategic energy review 
with an energy and climate change package focusing on EU energy policy internal and 
external aspects, which proposed targets on renewable energy, biofuels, and greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2020.  
 
The Commission aimed the climate package to set the agenda for the international 
community and set off concrete negotiations on a global climate deal, for several 
reasons, among which to strengthen EU leadership in the international context by 
showing determination for action; at the same time the deal would benefit the EU 
economy in terms of increased energy security and increased health; and finally it 
would encourage investments in clean technologies, but cooperation with developing 
countries was essential to meet targets and manage global warming. 
  
Energy is a field which touches upon interests at several levels: national, regional, EU 
and global; political, social, and economic interests; political ambitions of a obtaining a 
strengthened leadership position in the international context; internal (confidence of 
citizens (voters) and national / regional parliaments) as well as external credibility and 
political status; but also of ideas, linking energy with climate change; the EU is 
committed to a low carbon industry, and relating to Africa there is the responsibility of 
complying with commitments to meeting the 2015-goals. Energy is increasingly linked 
to the climate change challenge to development, economic growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries, on the one hand, and a perhaps moral obligation 
towards future generations, on the other. 
 
9.5. Summary 
This chapter has discussed some global implications of the areas contained in the 
political agenda of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The aim has been to discuss the EU’s 
Africa policy in a wider perspective to understand why we are witnessing the 
evolutionary trends presented in part two to include this wider perspective in the 
consideration in chapter ten. 
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In chapter ten we will conclude the study of the EU’s Africa Policy from 2000 to 2007 
and answer the questions set out in part one as well as include a brief discussion on 
future implications of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy for the EU-Africa political 
cooperation. 
 
10. Conclusions 
It was argued that the EU’s Africa policy must be understood in the wider 
perspective of an overall EU strategy in a globalized world; this argument is to be seen 
in the light of a security nexus emerged after the Cold War: the unfolding of a new 
world order in which the EU is positioning itself. The world is witnessing a relative 
weakening of the old superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, an 
increasing strengthening and cohesion of the European Community as a political actor 
in world politics, and new emerging powers such as China and India. 
 
Europe’s traditional threat-of-invasion-concept of self-defence was changed with the 
end of the Cold War. As stated in the ESS, the first line of defence would now often be 
abroad, with new threats no longer being purely military and thus requiring “a mixture 
of instruments” (ESS: 2003: 7). The tendency in Europe to step up its security concerns 
was associated with rising concerns over the impacts of terrorism. The launch of the 
ESS both buttressed two other policy instruments, the CFSP and the ESDP, enabling the 
Union to play a more proactive role on the international scene, while at the same time 
addressed ambitions of some Member States such as France and the UK to reinforce 
European autonomy adding a more military aspect to traditional soft power instruments. 
 
The ESS established security as a precondition of development, and argued that spill-
over effects from violent conflicts in regions outside the EU would have the potential to 
threat European security and values. After the launch of the ESS, a series of military 
initiatives were launched in Africa, and this may be interpreted only from a perspective 
of EU self-interest, however, ideational factors associated with EU core values are 
considered to have influenced, ideas such as solidarity and the fundamental freedoms, 
including the right to live in peace. 
 
The EU argument for ambitioning a leading role in globalization is that it has succeeded 
in integrating nearly 500 Million people on the European continent. Through the 
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establishment of rules and regulations it has built an inner market with a strong 
economy and a knowledge society. Through institutions and institutionalized inter State 
cooperation it has successively deepened its political integration. Because it has worked 
for Europe, it is believed that it will work for the world and the EU increasingly attempt 
to externalise its internal policies. However, this may prove problematic to assimilate in 
different political economies and cultures with weaker degrees of democratization and 
stronger authoritarian traditions. The EU model of cooperation and integration may 
have worked as a pole of attraction for the neighbouring countries, but without 
perspectives for further enlargements, the incentives may be less persuasive. The EU 
continues however to build strategic alliances throughout the world based on the 
assumption that the EU’s stability to a wide extent depends on the effective use of its 
external policies. The dominant discourse of “sharing of common values” as a basis for 
closer relationships with the EU is also a normative project, internally as well as 
externally, and a security strategy for the EU, as it is evidenced in the ESS and in the 
ENP both from 2003. However to view this evolution solely from an economist 
perspective as in the LI approach would not be fair in consideration of other influential 
factors associated with core EU values, strongly anchored in conceptions of the EU’s 
identity and linked to an idea of European security; they include values such as 
democracy, Human Rights, and solidarity; and they are partly the basis for external 
policy instruments such as development aid and humanitarian assistance. 
 
The EU is a mature economy, with an aging population and facing the need to manage 
immigration to maintain its social model and ensure its sustainable development. 
Having built its integration project upon trade cooperation to achieve a peace project as 
it overall aim, it now faces challenges beyond its territorial borders. The EU is fully 
aware of the globalization challenges and need for strategic alliances. Continental 
Africa is a strategic choice in the continuation of the EU’s wider neighbourhood. 
 
We saw that Africa represents an important field of interest for the EU with a mixed 
variety of motives including political, economic, military, security, social, 
environmental and moral aspects. Energy supply and Africa’s geographical proximity, 
historical relations with MS were considered important factors for achieving a high 
level of consensus between MS on the coordination of different policy instruments to 
establish coherence and effectiveness in EU foreign policy through a combined use of 
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soft power instruments including development aid, humanitarian assistance and 
diplomacy, as well as more military instruments including conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping missions. We consider however, that it would not be fair to consider 
solely the EU’s external action and foreign policy from a LI point of view. To consider 
EU’s action in the world solely from the perspective that economic interests and 
geopolitical considerations determine the EU’s decision making, would fail to consider 
other aspects intrinsically linked to the ideational makeup of the EU and closely linked 
to its core values. This is where the social constructivist perspective comes into play 
seeking to understand the dynamics of foreign policy and systemic change in European 
integration from a more holistic view taking into consideration the underlying ideas that 
have origin the interests in the first place. Where a LI approach would fail to consider 
the component of underlying ambitions prompting the interests such as e.g. the political 
ambition of turning the EU into an more powerful global player, the social 
constructivist approach would consider this aspect and argue that although interests 
partially explain the behaviour of politicians, these interests are made up of ideas: they 
are the basis for the development of the ideas. A political ambition in this case would be 
a presupposition of the material interests in increased power. 
 
We established that as a result of globalization, world politics is witnessing a tendency 
to hybridization of domestic-foreign affairs, both because multilateral cooperation is 
increasingly required on matters of global concern, but also because an increased 
interconnectedness and economic interdependence has made force less usable in favour 
of a greater tendency to state bargaining with other actors, favouring negotiation over 
the old power-politics model game in international relations. In Europe’s case this is 
expressed in a tendency to externalization of its internal norms and rules to the world. 
 
The importance of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy for the EU position in the world is 
linked to the perspective of turning the EU into a significant actor on the international 
scene. It gives the EU ample opportunity for increased visibility through involvement in 
conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU’s Africa Strategy has served as a 
stepping stone to create a strategic alliance with China though the establishment in 
2008, of a trilateral cooperation dialogue between the EU, Africa and China (COM: 
2008: 654). The policy initiative aims at a step-by-step approach to increased 
(economic) integration focusing on the areas of peace and security, infrastructure 
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(where the Chinese are already investing strongly), climate change and food security. 
The overall objective is (through plurilateralism) to enhance effective multilateralism. 
From a LI perspective it is an expression of enhancing EU economic interests and 
ensuring an important geopolitical alliance with two strategic partners: Africa and 
China. 
 
The economic interests associated with the EU’s Africa policy as well as geopolitical 
considerations are intrinsically linked to ideas of identity, security and values. These 
interests and ideas are articulated in the institutional framework, negotiated, mediated 
through a carefully orchestrated political discourse weaving together various strands in 
the form of parallel strategies. Peace and security have been among the most persistent 
EU political arguments for the development of a Joint Africa-EU Strategy, and thus 
linked to the EU security nexus in this thesis. But arguing that, it would not be adequate 
to consider the aspect of interest separate from ideational aspect to establish whether it 
had been primarily interests or ideas that dominated and influenced the evolution of the 
EU Africa policy, we established that it would be a combination of both; predominantly, 
however, economic and geopolitical interests but also linked to ideas of identity and an 
EU security community.  
 
In the word of President of the European Commission speaking on the European Union 
and Global Order at the EPC Annual Conference: “To propose our values goes hand in 
hand with defending our interests” (Barroso: 2008). 
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12. Portuguese summary 
O objectivo desta dissertação é estudar a evolução da política da UE para a África 
num período de sete anos entre 2000 e 2007 – desde a primeira à segunda Cimeira 
Europa-África. Pretende-se analisar que interesses e ambições da parte da UE têm 
motivado a evolução da sua política para a África no sentido de se formar uma Parceria 
Estratégica Conjunta entre os dois continentes. Pretende-se igualmente analisar em que 
medida esta contribui para o posicionamento da UE no mundo. 
 
Por um lado, a investigação estuda documentos relativos ao diálogo UE-África, com o 
objectivo de determinar que interesses, ideias e discursos foram dominantes; por outro 
lado, investigam-se documentos relacionados com estratégias paralelas durante o 
mesmo período igualmente considerados determinantes para a evolução da política da 
UE para a África. A análise empírica e a discussão dos interesses, ideias e discursos 
dominantes baseiam-se num quadro analítico “híbrido” com origens em três meta-
teorias: o Intergovernamentalismo Liberal, que defende que a integração Europeia 
reflecte interesses económicos dos Estados Membros na coordenação das suas políticas 
em primeiro lugar e só em segundo lugar reflecte motivos geoestratégicos mesmo no 
caso da política externa; o Construtivismo Social que defende que os interesses 
pressupõem ideias, e que importa entender que os Estados Membros agem numa 
combinação de ambos estes factores, interesses e ideias; a análise crítica de discurso 
alega que importa entender que discurso é utilizado para construir realidades sócias e 
identidades. Ao combinar as três abordagens pretende-se obter uma análise mais 
abrangente. 
 
O fim da Guerra Fria alterou o balanço de poder no mundo e uma nova ordem mundial 
está a colocar-se. A UE sofreu sucessivos alargamentos e aprofundou a sua integração 
com políticas cada vez mais abrangentes. A tese é que as políticas para a África da UE 
devem ser vistas num contexto politico mais amplo em que a UE ambiciona projectar-se 
no mundo como um actor global de peso com o poder para activamente influenciar a 
política mundial através duma abordagem mais elaborada que passa por integrar, alinhar 
e coordenar diversos instrumentos de acção externa com estratégias que a conferem uma 
maior visibilidade no mundo. 
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A proximidade geográfica da África, a sua relação histórica com os Estados Membros 
da UE e baixa sensibilidade político como região em comparação por exemplo com o 
Médio Oriente são considerados factores relevantes se ter registrado um alto nível de 
consenso entre os Estados Membros sobre a coordenação de diferentes instrumentos 
políticos relativos à política para a África. A UE visa estabelecer uma política externa 
coerente e eficaz através de iniciativas que vão desde ajuda para o desenvolvimento e 
ajuda humanitária a acção militar incluindo iniciativas que abrangem prevenção de 
conflitos, gestão de conflitos, e missões de paz e é fundamental a adesão dos Estados 
Membros nos esforços de coordenação das políticas. 
 
A análise comparativa entre as respectivas estratégias resultantes das duas Cimeiras 
conclui que houve uma mudança nas prioridades da agenda política em 2007 
relativamente ao 2000, que reflecte um crescimento importante da área da paz e 
segurança. Esta tendência atribui-se nos argumentos do discurso político à associação 
entre a paz e a segurança e o desenvolvimento; a segurança em África associa-se cada 
vez mais à segurança na Europa, o chamado “nexo de segurança Europeu”. 
 
O factual risco é discutível e contestado por alguns analistas políticos que alegam que a 
África serve em certa medida como terreno de ensaio para por um lado, permitir a 
Europa testar várias dimensões da Política para a África, e por outro lado, associa-se a 
crescente participação em missões de paz em África com o desenvolvimento da 
PESC/PESD (Política Externa e de Segurança Comum / Política Europeia de Segurança 
e Defesa) e com a ambição de alguns Estados Membros de conferir uma dimensão mais 
militar aos tradicionais instrumentos civis comunitárias nas suas relações externas. 
Defende-se que o desenvolvimento da PESC/PESD em combinação com a crescente 
preocupação com a segurança no mundo depois de 11 de Setembro, Madrid em 2003 e 
Londres em 2005 são factores que têm influenciado a mudança na agenda política com 
uma crescente importância dada à área da paz e segurança. 
 
A Estratégia África-UE enquadra-se num mundo caracterizado por uma crescente 
globalização, com novos desafios globais que incluem o aquecimento global, a energia, 
pandemías, segurança alimentar e terrorismo. Por um lado, os riscos globais em áreas 
ligadas à saúde e o ambiente têm trazido uma crescente ênfase na obrigação das 
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economias mais desenvolvidas para participarem no desenvolvimento de políticas 
globais e colaborar para a inclusão das economias menos desenvolvidos na economia 
mundial. Por outro lado, a própria Europa é uma economia madura, uma economia 
forte, mas caracterizado por uma população envelhecida e números negativos de 
crescimento demográfico. Novos desafios na forma de economias emergentes Asiáticas 
reforçam a competição sobre partes de mercados e acesso a energia e matérias-primas. E 
a Europa é altamente dependente de importação de energia e matérias-primas. O 
mercado interno Europeu depende da sua competitividade no mundo. A sua 
sobrevivência num Mercado global depende de reconhecimento global da sua sistema, e 
é por isso que a projecção externa de políticas comunitárias internas é considerado nos 
seus objectivos de política externa através de uma mistura que inclui relações 
estratégicas, diálogo político com parceiros estratégicos, PESC e PESD, cooperação 
para o desenvolvimento, comércio e competitividade, e Política de Vizinhança. 
 
Por estes motivos defende-se que a evolução da Política Europeia para a África deve ser 
visto num contexto estratégico mais amplo na qual a UE procura gerir a globalização 
para a sua vantagem e responder a riscos potenciais que possam ameaçar a segurança e 
a estabilidade Europeia, e por isso a UE procura influenciar o sistema multilateral; 
defende-se que tem que ser vista num quadro de uma série de estratégias que se tem 
surgido em paralelo, incluindo a Estratégia de Segurança Europeia (2003), o Consenso 
Europeu para o Desenvolvimento (2005) e estratégias que visam aumentar a coerência, 
a eficácia e a visibilidade da UE no mundo. Defende-se que estão todos 
interrelacionados através da questão da competitividade e à da nova ordem mundial que 
se tem estado a desenvolver desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Os riscos considerados de 
ameaça para a segurança da Europa passaram-se a defender fora das suas fronteiras, na 
vizinhança alargada. 
 
A investigação conclui que a África representa um núcleo importante de interesses para 
a UE. Os motivos e interesses são mistos e englobam aspectos políticos, económicos, 
militares, de segurança, sociais, ambientais e morais. Por um lado, a Europa tem laços 
históricos com a África e uma forte tradição de solidariedade, associado aos valores 
fundamentais da UE, democracia, liberdade, boa governância, Estado de Direito, 
igualdade de género; por outro defende-se que a ligação da Europa com a África está 
fortemente ligada às questões relacionadas com a segurança, a energia e a globalização. 
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A sobrevivência do modelo social Europeia depende da sua projecção no mundo, na sua 
capacidade de estratégia, de criar alianças poderosas no mundo com parceiros 
estratégicos como a África e a China, poderes emergentes na cena política mundial. Pela 
ambição assumida da UE em tomar um lugar de liderança e influenciar activamente a 
política mundial através de abordagens integradas passam por uma coordenação e 
harmonização das suas políticas externas e os seus instrumentos que incluem estratégias 
para uma maior visibilidade no mundo. Defende-se que é neste contexto que se deve 
considerar a evolução da política Europeia para a África de uma Estratégia Europeia 
para a África para uma Estratégia Conjunta UE-África. 
